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Lebanon hops on the crypto train

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Antoine Yazbek and Zaki Soubra are budding Lebanese cryptocurrency entrepreneurs, and they radiate seriousness in their endeavor. As a journalist, one is inclined to consider an entrepreneur serious if they answer a series of probing interview questions without losing their temper at the intrepid—or sometimes just intractable—media type across the table. A more general measure of seriousness in business, especially in a new fintech startup, is if the enterprise is founded with personal money.

Yazbek and Soubra pass the test on both counts. They set aside over an hour to detail their value proposition and enterprise development plan to Executive, and last year, they invested their own money into their first cryptocurrency venture: a cryptocurrency mine­—a facility with serious computing power that is dedicated to the production of cryptocurrency coins in—of all places cold and far, Iceland.

They do not disclose how much capital they committed to the venture—the partners only volunteer that their investment was 100 percent their own, and “above six digits and below seven digits” in dollar terms. Nor do they agree to disclose where they incorporated their offshore company for their initial foray into the global cryptocurrency realm, but it is clear that this tech startup has not been kissed by funding under the provisions of the famous Circular 331 from Banque du Liban, the Lebanese central bank.

“You have to put your money where your mouth is when you want to talk with an investor,” Soubra says, explaining the pair’s funding strategy. His partner, Yazbek, adds that they both learned the importance of an entrepreneur’s personal financial commitment when they were working in asset management for large Middle Eastern conglomerates and sitting on the buy side of the table, across from entrepreneurs looking for investment. 

Rather than divulging further details about the legal and financial information related to their first venture, the partners instead emphasize that they are determined to develop a new brand, under which they want to bundle as many as six diverse cryptocurrency-related services. “We have just registered our new brand under the name Crypten. This will be the umbrella for all that we aim to do; it is designed to stand for confidence and transparency, and the brand name will stay with us even as our verticals evolve. Above all, we want to build a brand that will inspire trust as we strive to be the continuous partner in crypto for stakeholders,” Yazbek tells Executive when confirming the launch of their corporate identity upon registration of their new brand in the last week of January, two weeks after the initial interview. 

During the first interview, he had explained that the facility they established in Iceland constitutes the first of six pillars, or business units, that they want to build under their brand. The other pillars will range from consultations on crypto assets for asset managers, high net-worth individuals, family offices, and financial professionals, to the for-profit provision of education and information seminars on the cryptocurrency economy.

Gate to crypto

Yazbek and Soubra chose to invest in Bitcoin mining and cryptocurrencies as their initial pillar because they perceived it as “a more stable business model” and value proposition than other segments of the cryptocurrency realm. They also reasoned that their mine would provide traditional investors with an “entry gate” to the crypto world, as it involves tangible investments into hardware that are well suited for presenting to prospective investors and clients, and because operating their own mining facility gives them the opportunity to acquire hands-on experience in this realm.

Going forward, the business plan is for the mining facility to grow organically and be kept under Soubra and Yazbek’s full ownership. The plan, however, includes added options for mining. One option is to rent out mining capacity to clients who want to produce their own cryptocurrency coins without exposing themselves to the  large investment expenditures required to set up their own mine. Other possibilities are to develop and manage a custom mining facility for a single investor on the side of the existing one, or to build an additional mine through a Crypten fund, attracting investors who are not necessarily interested in cryptocurrencies but are involved in tech investing.

The two partners say they became friends while studying economics at the American University of Beirut in the late 1990s. After having acquired about 15 years of experience in the finance field since they graduated in 1998, they separately discovered their passion for the crypto-economy about two to three years ago. When they reconnected in Beirut in 2016, they decided to team up.

“We truly believe in the advantages of cryptocurrencies and are both in it for the long term. This specifically means Bitcoin, but [beyond this] all cryptocurrencies in general. However, when I say this, I want to exclude many of the initial coin offerings, or ICOs, and new tokens that are just coming out. These are mostly rubbish because their underlying aspects are not strong enough,” Yazbek explains. (See glossary of cryptocurrency terms). Soubra adds, “Cryptocurrencies have real advantages, and sooner or later, even though there will be road bumps and some people will get burnt, the advantages of cryptocurrencies will impose themselves.”   

Their skepticism about the current ICO hype notwithstanding, the partners are not opposed in on principle to initial coin offerings. They envision creating an ICO consultancy as one of the pillars that they want to develop—possibly later—as part of the Crypten brand. “We believe that if ICOs are better regulated with a better framework, more companies are going to want to go [the ICO route]. We want to help these companies conceptualize their own tokens, write a white paper, and go to market. Crypten would perhaps underwrite part of the tokens and help them find investors in their tokens,” they explain.

They estimate that rollout of an ICO consultancy might still be a few years away and come after the crypto economy has acquired some greater regulatory maturity. Other pillars of the new Crypten brand might see the light sooner, and initially as tech consultancies. According to Yazbek, the planned asset-management pillar will initially provide technical advice and research, but will refrain from giving investment advice in the manner of a private bank. “We want to help any asset manager to understand [cryptocurrency] technology better, and we want to explain to them all different ways how to invest. So think of us as tech consultants for asset managers,” he emphasizes.

The second pillar, labeled as a brokerage pillar, will likewise commence as a consultancy, with a focus on solving problems people have in relation to cryptocurrency trading. Yazbek points out that it is very difficult for many people, locally and in other jurisdictions, to find out how to go about this business. The plan for the brokerage pillar is to show clients how they can participate in the cryptocurrency market and place even small amounts without succumbing to hype and scams or engaging in wild speculation. Another activity under this pillar will be the provision of storage for cryptocurrency wallets, either as “hot” or “cold” storage, meaning with or without online access to a client’s coins.

Like other experts on the matter, the pair found themselves spending a lot of time explaining to people what the whole crypto realm was about. They were confronted with a contradiction, or even paradox, when they would encounter people who were greatly under-informed about the crypto realm, but were already involved or wanted to get involved. This is the story behind the new brand’s pillar for providing training and education. “There is a huge gap in information and knowledge [among potential Crypten clients]. If we want to make a business out of cryptocurrency involvement, we realized that we have to bridge this gap through education. We need to educate our clients before we can have a large number of interactions about the crypto world with them. This is where the idea of [a consultancy] originated,” Yazbek says.

A vision to bridge gaps

The brand’s overall governing philosophy will stress objectivity, Soubra explains. “We want to be perceived [to be] as objective as possible because the whole thing we’re building is a trustworthy brand that is not partisan for one coin or the other,” he says. As to their competitive advantage in an area of economic activity that is expected to rapidly fill up with providers, Soubra says, “We feel that our main advantage is that we’ve been involved with the crypto world and with the younger, tech-savvy generation for a while now. We feel that we speak their language. At the same time, we speak the languages of traditional financial institutions because we both come from this background.”     

Soubra and Yazbek are setting their primary sights on winning clients among asset managers and high net-worth individuals, in family offices, finance houses, and banks. “We will be open to retail [clients] but we are not here for the hype. The goal is to take our knowledge and skill and use it to handhold potential investor clients or institutions interested in allocating funds to crypto,” in what they perceive as an unfolding paradigm shift in the entire world of finance, Yazbek says.

The ability to bridge the communication chasm between the new tech world and existing financial market leaders will be especially tested in the fifth Crypten pillar. This pillar is planned as blockchain consultancy with a mission to offer to financial institutions all the resources to understand how evolutions in the new technology affect them and which blockchain applications apply to them.

Knowing the importance of performing within the highly fluid environment of this paradigm shift, Soubra and Yazbek point out that the verticals or pillars of Crypten are not immutable. The venture’s organizational chart is not set in stone at this point, and verticals might be adapted and developed in response to market conditions. They are likely to also evolve along with the planned acquisition of licenses that the enterprise will need in order to give investment advice and move beyond a tech-consulting focus for some of the brand’s pillars. Some pillars might even be totally changed over the coming few years, the company founders acknowledge.

To them, flexibility is crucial, as no one can be certain how and in which direction the entire crypto realm will evolve. However, they are certain in their determination to build a trusted brand and also firmly convinced that cryptocurrencies will survive and stand tall, after having emerged from the expected phase of brutal adaptation. On top of that, they see cryptocurrency development as a chance for Lebanon to strengthen its economy, provided that the government adopts a proactive regulatory regime that sits well with the Lebanese central bank. “Let there not be a void; let the regulators decide on what they are comfortable with under the level of risks they see, but let there be something,” Yazbek states empathetically.

As Yazbek and Soubra see it, Lebanon has benefited greatly from BDL’s fostering of the country’s entrepreneurship ecosystem. This entrepreneurial edge, in conjunction with the country’s well-known competencies in the fields of banking and finance could, in their view, be developed into a powerful and fortuitous triangle by adding in the beam of virtual money. Says Soubra, “We feel that adding the field of cryptocurrency into the Lebanese mix will give us in this country a huge edge compared to our competitors, wherever they are.”


Legal aspects of digital currencies

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In the virtual Wild West of the digital economy created by the internet revolution, the emergance realm of cryptocurrency represents an important legal frontier. The rise of cryptocurrencies can be thought of as a digital-money revolution. Cryptocurrencies have the potential to transform the way people view money, how they transact, and even the overall structure of the financial system, starting from individuals all the way up to central banks and sovereign states.

Individual central banks and governments in different countries are considering new regulations and legal frameworks to rein in the wild horses of Bitcoin and other digital currencies. In the new year, the regulatory debate widened with remarks from the German central bank when Joachim Wuermeling, a member of the board of Germany’s Bundesbank, said national rules may struggle to contain a global phenomenon.

“Effective regulation of virtual currencies would … only be achievable through the greatest possible international cooperation, because the regulatory power of nation states is obviously limited,” Wuermeling said at a January event in Frankfurt, the German financial hub and seat of the European Central Bank,  according to Reuters.

Roughly at the same time as the German banker’s statement, French media reported that Bruno Le Maire, the French economy minister,  announced the creation of a working group to develop cryptocurrency regulations. According to the French financial daily Les Echos, he said the working group would be responsible for proposing guidelines and drafting a framework for cryptocurrency regulations aimed at preventing abuse of the technology and curbing speculation.

Given that South Korea, Japan, and China also sought to calm the waters of cryptocurrency speculation by talking publicly about introducing regulations, the number of people seeking to sell their cryptocurrency holdings has leapt upward, judging from market developments as well as media reports. There appears to be growing assumptions—which for some are mounting concerns—over the acceleration of globally coordinated cryptocurrency regulations: perhaps beginning with a meeting about the rise of Bitcoin planned for March, when the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors will convene in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Hosted for the second time by a Latin American nation since the inaugural G20 summit in 2008, G20 meetings this year are scheduled to include several meetings of finance leaders and a digital-economy working group before the G20 general summit at the end of November.

The current state of cryptocurrency

At present, cryptocurrency is governed mostly by financial-crimes regulations designed to cover money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial wrongdoings. Tax regulations on cryptocurrencies and on digital-currency exchanges are also important factors in this novel legal structure.

The United States Internal Revenue Service defines cryptocurrencies as a digital representation of value that function as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and a store of value, yet which does not have legal tender status in any jurisdiction. The legal framework applicable to the buyers, sellers, and users of cryptocurrencies is very basic, and it relies on existing legal concepts pertaining to commodities as well as value and exchange.

The central question is whether in a specific jurisdiction a cryptocurrency may be classified as money or not. Answers have been legally inconsistent due to the hybrid nature of digital currency as a means of exchange. Also, different countries have adopted conflicting regulatory and legislative responses, some supportive and others restrictive, depending on the classification of the cryptocurrency either as a commodity or a currency.

Categorizing Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies from a legal perspective is complex because unlike electronic money, for example, a cryptocurrency does not legally represent a “claim” on the issuer. It is a rather fluid and versatile concept, and its legal status is open to a broad interpretation. Arguably, authorities and legislators have not fully come to grip with all of the ramifications of cryptocurrencies, and this lack of governance has led to a general reluctance to accept cryptocurrencies.

Legal Framework in the US and EU

In the US, cryptocurrencies are permissible. Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies have been classified as convertible decentralized virtual currencies and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission treats Bitcoin as a commodity like gold, judging that it should be taxed on this basis.

There have been some attempts to regulate the cryptocurrency market in the US. In 2014, Benjamin Lawsky, then the New York state financial services chief, took a conservative stance on cryptocurrencies, mainly due to money laundering and terrorist-financing considerations, and spearheaded the historic regulatory framework for Bitcoin, referred to as BitLicense.

A BitLicense is essentially a business license for virtual-currency activities issued by the New York State Department of Financial Services for New York companies and residents. Crypto-economy startup Ripple, operator of a “digital asset” called XRP, the fastest and most scalable digital asset enabling real-time cross-border payments, and Coinbase, a cryptocurrency exchange platform headquartered in the US, were both successful in obtaining BitLicenses in 2016 and 2017, respectively. Members of the cryptocurrency community have criticized New York’s interventionist regulatory provisions, as many of them hold the view that the cryptocurrency market should remain unregulated to avoid harming the potential for long-term innovation.

The European Union also lacks a solid cryptocurrency and blockchain regulatory regime. This is not surprising, as the technology is very new. However, the legal status of digital currencies has been analyzed and considered by the European Central Bank, the European Parliament, and the European Commission. The Court of Justice of the European Union was asked to opine on applicability of Value-Added Tax (VAT) to Bitcoin, and it concluded that Bitcoin is a currency and not a commodity (unlike the approach adopted by the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission) and hence it is exempt from VAT.

It appears that for the moment there is no clear consensus on whether Bitcoin should be treated as a currency or as a commodity. This distinction is important, because if it is treated as currency, it would fall under the jurisdiction of a central bank, and if it is a commodity, it would fall under the relevant commodity authority and face tax implications such as VAT.

The emergence of cryptocurrencies has caught markets unprepared. In 2016, the European Parliament voted for the establishment of a task force to develop financial regulations designed to harmonize the market. However, until the harmonization process is in place, each country is taking its own measures.

While the situation is very much in flux and new discussions on regulations may erupt every day, the general position in Europe at the time of writing is that cryptocurrencies and ancillary activities that derive from it are legal. Le Maire, the French economy minister, said that a working group headed by Jean-Pierre Landau, the former deputy governor, the country’s central bank, had been established to propose regulations and parameters designed to ensure that cryptocurrencies are used within the limits of the law and not to abuse the tax and payment systems, Les Echos reported recently.

France has been very active in this sector, passing regulations for Bitcoin market transparency in 2014 which require Bitcoin distributors to identify their customers and the applicability of capital gains tax to digital currencies, according to an official press release. In the UK, digital currencies are treated as “private” money and they are subject to taxation based on profits from sales.

European and UK regulators have issued warnings against cryptocurrency investments and are pushing for stricter regulations. Due to the secrecy around cryptocurrencies, the expectation is that the UK and the European governments will pass legislation in 2018 to regulate cryptocurrencies, aligning them anti-terrorism and money-laundering legislation. This might not be counterproductive, as it is likely to create legitimacy and credibility for the digital market.

Legal Framework in the Middle East

Central banks and governments in the Middle East have been very cautious in supporting cryptocurrencies. Although the Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority has not banned Bitcoin specifically, it has encouraged dealers not to use it due to its highly speculative nature. Banque du Liban, the central bank of Lebanon, has decreed that banks and exchanges cannot transact in virtual currencies. In Jordan, the central bank has also discouraged the use of cryptocurrencies, which it does not consider legal tender, and it forbids financial institutions, financial companies, and exchanges from dealing in cryptocurrencies.

In the United Arab Emirates, trading cryptocurrencies is legally prohibited pursuant to the Regulatory Framework for Stored Value and Electronic Payment Systems issued by the Central Bank of the UAE in January 2017. A one-sentence provision in this regulation (Provision D.7.3) reads, “All Virtual Currencies (and any transactions thereof) are prohibited.”

In spite of this prohibition, Bitcoin trading, according The National, occurs on a regular basis, and it has become what appears to be a “tolerated practice” according to several legal advisors. Several real-estate brokers and entrepreneurs last fall announced their willingness to receive property payments in Bitcoin. Strengthening this view, local media last year repeatedly cited Mubarak Al Mansouri, the governor of the UAE central bank, as saying in January 2017 that the aforementioned new regulations do not cover digital currency, “defined as any type of digital unit used as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, or a form of stored value,” and “do not apply to Bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies, currency exchanges, or underlying technology such as blockchain.”  He also stated that digital currencies are currently being reviewed and new regulations will be issued in due course. However, in remarks made later in the year, Governor Al Mansouri warned about volatility risks related to trade in cryptocurrencies. At present, it is not clear if Bitcoin can be used a form of payment or for money transfers in the UAE.

State-backed digital currencies: the way forward?

Estonia presented a proposal back in 2013 designed to launch its own state-managed digital currency, estcoin, but this was strongly dismissed by European Central Bank President Mario Draghi. More recently, Venezuela, under tremendous financial pressure, announced a plan for a sovereign oil-backed digital currency that was criticized by many international experts. However,  state-backed digital currencies could be in the cards in the GCC and the wider Arab region. There has been ongoing discussion that Saudi Arabia and UAE may create a cryptocurrency for cross-border transactions under the umbrella of the two central banks via blockchain technology.

In 2016, the Dubai Future Foundation established the Global Blockchain Council, indicating that the technology is being studied and not dismissed out of hand. The challenge is significant. “Technology advances such as blockchain are causing massive shifts to the way we use financial services,” noted Abdul Basitt Qayed, managing director of private investment firm Ghaf Capital, “but regulations are struggling to keep pace with the rate of change in new technologies for the past decade, and by the time they build new laws and regulations for such technology, [they] will be outdated, because a new technology will appear to replace the old one. Since technology [is] outpacing human development, regulators need to learn technologies faster and increase their ability to adapt.”

Riad Salameh, the governor of Lebanon’s central bank, has also suggested that the government is looking at the possibility of a state-backed cryptocurrency (see overview and interview). These are highly significant developments for the region, although a timeline for implementation has not been set. A distinction is being made between central bank transactions and the use of cryptocurrencies for individuals. Certainly, validation by UAE and Saudi central banks might influence other countries in the region.

Many observers are predicting that it is only a matter of time before central banks across the world will launch their own cryptocurrency and move toward a cashless society. Banks are embracing blockchain technology across different sectors, including derivatives.

In the next 18 months, a global regulatory framework for the sector must be developed, but in order to be successful, it will need to balance intervention and innovation. It appears that there is no stopping the digital financial economy, and the players who fail to assimilate and adapt to this new system risk becoming obsolete.

Is Lebanon technologically ready to tackle growth?

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In March 2017, The Economist reported that Intel, the giant American chipmaker, paid $15.3 billion for Mobileye, an Israeli firm at the forefront of developing autonomous-car technology. The deal was not the first to involve an Israeli tech firm attracting foreign buyers, but it was the biggest yet. The Mobileye acquisition is an example of how Israel’s technological edge has strengthened its economy, and a reminder of the crucial role that technology and production efficiency play in the growth process of any economy today.

Of course, very few countries have the necessary elements to create an edge in technology—especially if they are a developing country, and more so if they go through recurrent political instability. Lebanon is generally known to have an educated workforce, and during the postwar rebuilding period it benefited from considerable capital accumulation. But it has also been subject to political setbacks that have sapped its energies.

One way to understand Lebanon’s growth process and the role of technology in its economic development is  to examine what the American economist Robert Solow called the sources of growth, or the factors that contribute to gross domestic product (GDP): human labor, physical capital, and total-factor productivity (TFP). TFP measures the contribution to GDP that cannot be explained by labor or capital—in other words, it captures extra factors that affect the overall efficiency of production, like political stability, technology, human capital, governance, institutional quality, and cultural traits.

Research published in 2003 by Barry Bosworth and Susan Collins of the Brookings Institution shows that for developed economies, TFP contributes close to 40 percent of growth in output, making growth an “intensive” process that is dependent on technology and the quality of inputs. But in developing countries, TFP contributes no more than 10 percent to growth, clearly indicating that growth is still heavily reliant on the quantity of inputs.

The picture is worse for Arab countries, where the contribution of TFP has been zero and sometimes negative, according to 2007 research by Aamer Abu-Qarn and Suleiman Abu-Bader published in the journal “World Development,”  which implied that TFP has held back production efficiency and economic output due to technological underdevelopment, political instability, and institutional weakness. These outcomes did not spare the buoyant, modernizing countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Evidence compiled by Raphael Espinoza in a 2012 research paper for the University of Oxford shows that TFP growth was negative for all GCC countries between 1990 and 2009, and only positive for three countries when non-oil output is considered: Kuwait, Oman, and UAE, which had an annual TFP growth of 0.9, 0.8, and 0.2 percent respectively.

The two glaring exceptions to the international picture are China and Israel. China has returned to the world economic stage with gusto, averaging an annual GDP growth rate of 9.2 percent between 1978 and 2004, and, just as importantly, an average TFP growth of 4 percent—translating into a TFP contribution to output growth at 43.5 percent, which is even higher than that of developed economies. While less advertised, Israel’s experience has been equally notable: GDP growth in the same period averaged 4.3 percent and TFP growth 1.97 percent, indicating that the TFP contribution to output growth was at 45.8 percent.

Politics affects growth

What about Lebanon? The table, from research done by the Lebanese economist Ali Bolbol, displays the growth accounting numbers for Lebanon between 1992 and 2015, and for four consecutive sub-periods within these 23 years. Overall, GDP growth was 4.69 percent, but TFP growth was 0.52 percent annually, thus contributing only 11.1 percent to growth.

Growth was driven mostly by physical capital accumulation at 2.43 percent, which thus contributed more than 50 percent to growth. Interesting patterns emerge in the sub-periods: During the rebuilding period of 1992–1998, growth was notably characterized by TFP at 1.95 percent, but more so by capital accumulation at 3.21 percent. A slowdown period followed, which was characterized by political bickering and culminated with the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005. TFP dropped precipitously during that period, robbing from growth at the rate of 2.33 percent annually.

The subsequent 2007–2010 period was underpinned by the Doha Accord of political reconciliation. TFP did well, growing at 2.24 percent, but the construction boom in the real estate sector had the biggest effect, with capital growing at 5.49 percent and contributing more than 50 percent to growth. The last period, 2011 to 2015, was the most dismal, marked by internal political paralysis and the Syrian war. TFP contracted at a rate of 1.77 percent annually, and even capital accumulation suffered due to the dearth of investment, growing at only 0.98 percent. Labor growth saved the day, growing at 2.85 percent, thanks in part to inflows of low-cost Syrian labor. It contributed more to Lebanon’s GDP growth during this period than capital growth and TFP combined.

Overall, post-war Lebanon has fared better than its Arab counterparts. Capital accumulation explained slightly more than 50 percent of its growth, whereas TFP growth was positive and contributed close to 12 percent to growth. But compared to countries like China and Israel, Lebanon has done poorly as far as TFP is concerned—that is, in terms of technological development and the quality of inputs.

It was always quite evident that political stability matters greatly to growth; now, we can put an approximate number on it. As reflected in TFP, we saw that between 1999 and 2006, political instability denied the economy 2.33 percent annually in growth, whereas between 2007 and 2010, political stability added 2.24 percent. This is the minimum impact, since instability can also affect labor utilization and capital investments.

But TFP captures more than the impact of politics. What Lebanon needs is not only continuous political stability, but also a climate that fosters innovation and technological growth. Focusing on technological growth is one of the most effective ways to boost TFP, and, with it, overall growth. In this respect, Banque du Liban, the central bank of Lebanon, took a welcome step in the right direction with Circular 331, an initiative to channel bank investments into “knowledge economy” entrepreneurs establishing companies in Lebanon through direct investment or via a locally based venture capital (VC) outfit. However, this was an isolated event within a sector that lacks momentum and a VC culture, in an overall environment that still remains cumbersome to invest in, because of a lack of modern regulations and good governance. The government must clear the way for investing, and the private sector must seize these incentives and take on investments that can ultimately transform the economy into a modern, technology-driven economy.

The private sector will need first and foremost an educated labor force to carry out these structural changes. The popular perception that the Lebanese education system is extraordinary may not hold water: TFP growth in post war Lebanon has been low, and the contribution of education small. A 2016 UN report on Lebanon, “Mind the Gap,” argues that the country should design an educational system that focuses more on new technologies and applied sciences, reverses the widening skills gap, and exploits cooperation between universities and the private sector.

Lebanon’s comparative advantage no longer lies in services, given the emerging and competing centers in the region, like Dubai. Technology is now  the undeniable driving force behind growth and the rise of modern economies. Post-war Lebanon is still lacking in this respect, as apparent in the country’s relatively low TFP. It can reverse this pattern by maintaining political stability, enriching human capital and talent, and improving governance and the business environment. If it fails to do so, the country will lag increasingly behind its peers, and move toward a dimmer future.

Bringing order to the Order

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After living in France for 30 years, Jad Tabet, an architect and urban planner, returned to Lebanon early last year to run for the presidency of the Order of Engineers and Architects of Beirut (OEA), an independent trade syndicate covering all Lebanese regions bar the North. Tabet campaigned as an independent against Paul Najem, a Free Patriotic Movement candidate that was backed by several of Lebanon’s most powerful political groups. Having secured an unlikely victory in May, he is turning his attention to several ambitious goals for his three-year term, including reforming the organization and increasing employment for members in new sectors. Executive sat down with the new president in January to discuss his plans for the OEA.

E   Tell me about your platform, and why you think you were able to come out on top.

In the last few years, there has been a large civic movement, with people raising different issues related to the question of garbage, electricity, water, pollution, etc. My platform was based on several things. The first thing was the participation of engineers in the large issues that concern the public. We think that all these issues are related, from electricity to transportation to pollution to the preservation of heritage, forests, natural heritage, etc. All of these issues [fall under the purview] of engineers and architects. We have technical solutions for these things. So one of the first points on my platform was that the order should play a role in these issues. This was not the case before, so since September, we have launched a series of conferences during which all these issues were debated, and we invited people from the government, from different administrations, to come and discuss these issues with us.

The second thing that we raised was the role of the engineers and architects in the market. The problem is that the market is shrinking. Traditionally, Lebanese engineers and architects worked not only in Lebanon but across the whole Arab region. We have 52,000 engineers and architects registered in the order. Obviously, the Lebanese market cannot provide opportunities for everyone, so what [has] happened since the 50s [is that] Lebanese engineers and architects [have] worked in the Arab region—mainly in the Gulf—but also in Africa. Now, we know that the market in these regions is shrinking, and this is creating a big problem for us, for engineers. Moreover, the real-estate situation in Lebanon is also shrinking, and we know through the number of buildings permits for the year [that] 2017 was not a good year, and we’re not expecting 2018 to be better. So this also raises a problem for the engineers [trying] to find work.

E   What are your main priorities for 2018?

We are raising two issues. The first one should be a real transformation in the practice of engineering and architecture in this country. I deeply believe that there is general trend everywhere in the world toward what I call the environmental revolution—I think we’re entering  a new phase of  human history, protecting the environment is becoming a major issue, and our engineers and architects in Lebanon should be trained for this.

I think this will open new initiatives and new work possibilities for them everywhere in the world, if we train our engineers and architects [in environmental protection] and green buildings…this will open new [opportunities] for them. I deeply feel that [in] the next 10 or 20 years, the issue of the environment will be [commonplace]. Everywhere in the world today, environmental protection [is] becoming [a] major issue, and [at the moment] we in Lebanon [have not yet caught up]. We should give much more importance to this and we should train our engineers and architects for it.

The other issue is [the] internal organization of the order. The order now has [just over] 50,000 members, but it is still working  as a small club. So one of the main issues I’m [pursuing] is transforming the order into a modern institution, and to have it [rated by the International Organization for Standardization, or ISO]. With 52,000 engineers, we should become a real modern institution with very clear rules of governance. This is not the case today.

We should have a real structure that functions well: How do you [expect] the order to really serve the engineers if the structure does not function well? The other thing that I really want is to have very strict rules of governance with no conflict of interest possible. This is very important to me.

When I was elected, I did two things immediately. First of all, I [issued] a declaration of what money I owned in accounts in the banks, as houses [in] real estate, etc. [I] put in a sealed envelope [the information about] all I owned. This envelope is sealed, and it can be opened at any time in order to have  real transparency.

The other thing I [issued was] an official conflict of interest declaration. I [used the] example of what is done [by] international organizations. You know when you have UNESCO, [the] United Nations, [its necessary for] key staff to [release a statement] on conflict-of-interest. I did it, and I want to generalize it for all the elected people in the order. I think this is very important. Having a very clear rule of transparency is something that, in a country like Lebanon, is very important.

E   What are some specific examples of the structural shortcomings you’ve alluded to?

For the time being we don’t have an HR department—we have 140 employees, but we don’t have an HR department. [At the moment], it’s the director of the order and the president who are acting as HR managers, which is not [acceptable]. This is one example. We have really to [create] a real structure. We have, for example, a very light and poor communications department, which is not acceptable. We have to [improve the] communications department with new technologies, etc. The website of the order is very bad. So all these things should be transformed and changed, and for this reason we should probably hire new people—but I don’t want to hire people before the whole evaluation and the whole new structure is done.

E   What are your next steps in achieving this ISO certification?

We are now launching a tender among international companies to help us establish a new [internal] organization, to first of all do an evaluation of the situation of the administration in the order today, then propose a new organizational chart that will allow us to have an order that is organized based on international standards, so that we can apply to have the ISO certification. We’re launching it in the following months.

E   What is your expected time frame?

The whole process will take around one year [or] one year and a half, and in that case I want to do it before I leave the order. I want to have the order certified ISO before I leave. We got the approval of the [OEA] council.

E   You’ve spoken about environmental training programs to help Lebanese gain employment abroad, but what can be done for those engineers and architects that hope to make a living while remaining in Lebanon?

I think also in Lebanon this is a very important issue. You know that more and more environmental issues in Lebanon are becoming very important. You have a lot of pollution; it’s becoming [a] major environmental issue. It’s [a] health issue also.

What we can do is basically training first and then raising awareness—raising awareness and exerting pressure on the government and on [the] public sector to issue laws and regulations for environmental protection. We did something; now it has become a nest for all big projects that are examined by the higher council of urban planning. All big projects that are examined by the higher council of urban planning should have an environmental approach.

We have started [a] training center in the order. We have started to do training sessions on environmental issues. We’re preparing the engineers, for example, to become LEED [Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design] registered engineers. You register in the order [for] the program of training and then once you [finish] with the program you can go to the LEED and present your [qualifications] to become LEED certified.

E   Architects and engineers frequently report that they are underpaid in relation to the fees recommended by the OEA. What can be done to improve their wages?

This is true. Look, I will tell you something. We’re in a free market. Lebanon is a free market, and you can’t intervene. The percentage put in the order is a sort of incentive, it’s a direction that is given, but you cannot force [it]. You can’t force the owners, the developers, to apply these things. [For example, the Tripoli OAE said fees paid to members should be paid at the order at fixed rates. But members started to reimburse part of their salary to developers to remain competative.]

E   Architects and engineers also report issues of overregulation associated with technical control offices that were established a few years ago.

It’s not the order that installed this; [it was] the government. It’s a governmental decree imposing this issue of technical control, which is something that came from France. It’s a copy of what happens in France. I think the decree has a lot of things that do not work. It’s not well applied in Lebanon; it’s not adapted to the Lebanese case. We are now discussing [it] with these [offices]. [Currently] you have seven bureaus of control, technical offices. We’re talking with them to try to set up some rules for their work.

We want to organize these technical control offices, because we’re getting a lot of complaints from engineers that they take money, [but] they don’t do what is really important, and what is their real function. They don’t go to the site, etc. So we want to [impose some] sort of control on them. We hope that the decree will be changed. We’re trying to work on a committee that would propose amendments to the decree to the government and to the minister of public works.

E   When you ran for the presidency of the OEA, a few parties said they backed you, including Beirut Madinati, Kataeb, and the Progressive Socialist Party. Do you identify with any of these parties?

No. In fact, I will tell you exactly what happened. I had been living in France for 30 years, and in December 2016, I got a phone call from a former student of mine [who] told me, “We want to have somebody that runs for the presidency of the order, that could be backed by the civil society, who would not be affiliated to any political party … You are a figure, a professional figure. We want you to run for this post.” I told them, “Look, I don’t think we have [a good chance of winning], but, if you want, I will do it just to do campaign that raises major issues.” We did the campaign, I was backed by several [groups]: Beirut Madinati, but not only [them], by other civil-society groups [as well]. The backing by Kataeb and [the] Progressive Socialist Party only came [in] the last week. I will be very frank with you. The whole campaign was done with the civil society, not only Beirut Madinati. 

E   So you were not, and are not, a member of Beirut Madinati?

I’ve never been a member of Beirut Madinati. Never. I have friends in Beirut Madinati. I have people with whom I work, but I’m not a member of Beirut Madinati.

E   When you were elected, you won by a narrow margin of only 21 votes. How would you describe your relationship with the OAE council and other members now that you’re the president?

You know that the council of the order is sort of [a] reduced example of the Council of Ministers. You have all political parties there. It’s not always easy. I always say that, well, I’m not against political parties. I’m not against engineers and architects being affiliated to political parties, but what is important is that when they are in the order, they basically act as [such], having in mind the interest of engineers and architects. And what I told them, what I always tell [them], is that they should take these interests and concerns and [raise them with] their political parties, and not the reverse. Not the interest and concerns of their political parties the order. This is very simple to say, but it’s very difficult to apply. It’s not easy. I’m trying to work with this. We’ll see.

(This interview has been edited for length and clarity.)

In high spirits

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Behind that flute of prosecco or gin-based cocktail enjoyed at a bar after a long day—or even the single malt whisky or bottle of wine recommended by a premium specialty liquor boutique—there is an intricate distribution chain.

Executive sat down with Lebanon’s major spirit importers and brand owners to discuss the Lebanese drinks of choice for 2017, the drinks consumption trends, how they were consumed, and by whom.

Reasons to celebrate

Spirit distributors had several reasons to toast in 2017. Diageo marked its 20th anniversary with various promotional activities, which introduced Lebanese consumers to the company behind well-known brands like Johnnie Walker whisky and Dom Pérignon champagne. “We wanted to highlight Diageo’s contribution to the business in terms of elevating the standards of service, building markets, growing the trade, [and] providing leadership for the industry,” says Ziad Karam, MENA corporate relations director for Diageo. Lebanon, he added, is among the key sales markets for Diageo worldwide.

Having acquired and re-launched the Edrington Group portfolio in Lebanon early in 2017, Carlo Vincenti, the owner of G. Vincenti & Sons, says its brands—in particular The Famous Grouse blended Scotch whisky and Macallan single malt whisky—had record growth. “The Famous Grouse had an almost 50 percent increase in sales in 2017 when we took over, and is now the preferred brand in [bars and restaurants]. The Macallan also had a record year in 2017, with an almost 100 percent increase from 2016: For example, we sold a Macallan Lalique bottle,” says Vincenti, referring to a 65-year-old limited-edition bottle priced at $36,000.

In fact, all the spirit distributors who spoke with Executive say 2017 was an overall growth year compared to 2016. “It was a very good year for spirits, with an overall double-digit growth across most of our spirits portfolio,” says Jeanine Ghosn, managing director of Gabriel Bocti.

Etablissements Antoine Massoud (EAM) also reports a positive 2017 for both its spirits-distribution arm and its retail arm, The Malt Gallery, which completed its third year of operations early in 2018. “The growth rate for EAM spirits arm is 10 percent, while for The Malt Gallery it’s 40 percent. The Malt Gallery has become an important component of our business and constitutes almost 14 percent of our sales,” says Anthony Massoud, EAM’s owner and managing director, adding that while whisky is a major contributor of sales in The Malt Gallery, wine and craft beer are becoming important components as well (for more on craft beer see article).

Is it party time in Lebanon?

Sales flourished last year despite the usual obstacles, both in the on-trade (hospitality venues such as restaurants and bars) and off-trade (retail spaces such as supermarkets or specialty stores) sectors.

Summer 2017 saw the opening of several new rooftop bars and clubs, much to the delight of spirit distributors, who see them as an opportunity to showcase their brands. “The summer was very good for the industry—especially for on-trade, since a lot of new places opened, and they were all very active and fully booked on weekends. Such clubs have a 1,500 [person] capacity, so it’s very good for business. However, these clubs usually have exclusivity deals with spirit distributors, so while profitability shrinks, it’s still a showcase for our brands,” says Roy Diab, marketing manager for Fawaz Holdings. Diab explains that brands that are marketed successfully in the on-trade sector eventually become popular and more consumed off-trade, and, as such, the on-trade sector is an important marketing tool for distributors.

While summer 2017 may have been a good season for the on-trade sector, some spirit distributors believe that the political uncertainties of November 2017 (the resignation and susequent return of PM Saad Hariri) put a stopper in the drinks on-trade market and led to a slight downturn in December’s performance. “In the on-trade, we were depending on end-of-year sales, and those were not as good as expected because tourists didn’t come to Lebanon for New Year’s,” says Ziad Nacouzi, head of the spirits distribution division at Neo Comet KFF Food and Beverage.   

Gabriel Bocti’s Ghosn explains that the length of Lebanon’s tourism season—which used to be the whole month of December for end-of-year festivities, and July and August for the summer—is becoming shorter and shorter, which means the periods of high-frequency alcohol consumption are becoming narrower.

Vincenti also complains about the seasonality in on-trade due to low domestic consumption. “The HORECA performance is very much linked to the seasonality and festive timings, because it relies on expats and Arab tourists who are still not coming [to Lebanon] in big volumes, except for [during the] holidays,” he says, using an acronym for the food-service industry. “Domestic consumption spending is too small and doesn’t even cover 30 percent of the HORECA potential considering the number of venues in Lebanon and the number of people who go out.”

Price wars

Although distributors agree that December was a good month for the off-trade sector—largely driven by holiday gifting and increasingly lavish home celebrations—they say that the dwindling purchasing power among average consumers has become an issue. “Lebanese are still struggling with their purchasing power, the perfect example being when there were a lot of price cuts on alcohol in supermarkets in December,” says Samer Nassar, head of marketing at Diageo. “People are either moving to the more accessible categories as compared to the standard, or going to premium, but standard is still the biggest category.”

Indeed, starting in mid-November 2017, alcohol consumers were bombarded with text messages promoting major retailers’ promotions on all varieties of alcohol. Supermarket aisles were crowded with significant discounts on many alcohol brands and holiday promotions, such as free glasses with every bottle purchased. Major retailers were competing to provide the most attractive deals on alcohol, which would lure consumers into their spaces and get them buying.

For Diab, the problem with these price wars is that they negatively impact a premium brand’s perception. “The issue is that price reflects image, value, and position in the market, so when the price of a premium brand starts fluctuating downward in the market, questions may arise among consumers on the legitimacy and authenticity of the product from one end, as well as the image perception from the other end,” he says, explaining that since Fawaz Holdings has good relationships with these retailers, they usually reach an agreement to restrict the price cuts.

Ongoing trends

Trends in spirits consumption among Lebanese consumers did not change much in 2017. “A trend is not a fashion or a fad, and it lasts for a while—for almost 10 years. So today, we’re still in this trend of premierization, crafts, and cocktails,” explains Massoud.

Indeed, all the distributors Executive spoke to said they continued to see growth in their premium or high-end brands across all categories. Nacouzi says he saw an increase in sales of 10 percent and above in his company’s premium whiskies portfolio, mentioning that it recently released Dewar’s 25 into the market—priced at $225 a bottle—to positive feedback from consumers.

Likewise, despite an overall stagnation in the standard vodka category, the high end has been doing well. “Although consumption of regular vodka has slowed down, super-premium vodka continues to grow ,and Grey Goose saw a 20 percent increase,” says Nacouzi, explaining that since vodka is associated with partying, its growth is related to the new high-end bars and clubs that opened this summer.

Like Nacouzi, Diab says Absolut Vodka saw 8 percent growth compared with 2016—lead by an increase in off-trade consumption following two major holiday engagements for the brand in 2017—which, he says, is a significant increase given it already has a large volume base.

Of gins and single malts

The trend of gin consumption also continued through 2017. “Although it remains a small segment of the spirits industry, contributing less than 1 percent of its total value, it’s definitely the fastest growing,” says Diageo’s Nassar.

Speaking for Bocti, which distributes Hendrick’s gin, Ghosn says bottles of gin are now being offered on tables in nightclubs (for consumers to drink with their mixer of choice), while Fawaz Holdings’ Diab says gin consumption is still going strong both on- and off-trade.

“Beefeater, our core gin brand, is still doing strong in the on-trade and is growing in the off-trade because home consumption is increasing. People are growing more accustomed to creating their own cocktails at home or getting bar catering for their private events,” he explains, adding that super-premium gin is also growing solidly. Monkey 47, a super-premium gin made with 47 botanicals, is doing so well, Diab says, that Fawaz Holdings had to revise and increase the volume allocation for Lebanon twice in 2017.

Likewise, single malt whiskies are increasingly popular, and Nacouzi says his sales in that category have increased by 25 percent in 2017. Vincenti explains that the strength of the single malt whisky trend is in its value. “I would say the total single malt consumption in Lebanon increased by 30 to 40 percent [since the trend started in 2015], and it’s still driving the whisky category upwards in volume to some extent, but more importantly, in value. To give you a small example, in 2017, we sold five bottles of Bowmore 50 Year Old for $20,000 for each bottle [in our retail showcase store. The Cask and Barrel], which would have never been possible three years ago. This shows that there is a serious single malt fan base developing in Lebanon,” he says, adding his company has a waiting list on limited edition bottles.

Sparkling is better

Meanwhile, a new trend of prosecco consumption emerged in 2017. “Women primarily drive this category in both the on-trade and off-trade segments. Today, on the supermarket shelf you can find a large number of prosecco brands, while three years ago, you would only have seen a few brands,” says Diab.

The distributors Executive spoke to tried to explain prosecco’s rising allure. “Prosecco was growing slightly in 2016, but exploded in 2017.  It’s a global trend that we’re following. It’s also smooth to drink, and the price compared to champagne is also attractive. There is a difference between a bottle of champagne sold for between $40 and $60, and a bottle of prosecco, which you can find for $10 to $12. There’s a big three-digit growth in some cases in this category,” says Ghosn.

Massoud explains that while champagne has always been an occasional drink in Lebanon and mainly associated with celebrations, prosecco is today more accessible and regularly served in bars and clubs.

Livia Bergmeijer | Executive

Who’s drinking?

Distributors agree that these trends are driven by well-traveled Lebanese in their mid-20s and above, who are social media savvy. “The new generation and young drinkers have more curiosity and are more exposed to social media, and so you feel they want different drinks than the older generation used to consume. With them, it’s more about the experience and the journey. When we introduce niche new brands to the market, there is curiosity from the consumer where before we were met with resistance,” explains Ghosn.

To Nacouzi, this means less volume, but more value. “People are upgrading what they drink: Instead of going out every night they go out less, but consume higher-quality, and hence, more expensive alcohol. It’s also a sign of prestige to bring premium alcohol to a party or to a house party one is catering. Also, some on-trade outlets use the premium brands as their go-to pouring [brand] to distinguish themselves from the competition,” says Nacouzi.

Distributors also give credit to their own marketing efforts which, they say, support these trends and sustain them through a variety of events, including tastings for consumers, training for bar staff, and social media campaigns. “We’re very dedicated and aggressive in events, visibility in the trade, in promotions, and a lot of tastings across the whole market. All our competitors are also doing this, and we have common platforms like the Whiskey Live event or dedicated platforms like Malt Gallery. We’re all working on further exposing these brands to the consumers,” says Ghosn.

All in all, 2017 was another good year for Lebanon’s spirits importers and brand owners, and while concerns over the increased end price of imported alcohol, and the low purchasing power of the domestic market continue to worry those in the industry, it looks like 2018 will be another good year for spirits. 

 

Cheers for the beers

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Compared to the ancient history of beer in the Middle East, Lebanon’s small craft breweries are extremely new on the scene. The earliest evidence of beer brewing was found in Mesopotamia some 6,000 years ago, while the world’s oldest brewery, which was located in Egypt, dates to around 3400 BC. Beer eventually made it to Europe in the Middle Ages, where consumption of the brew flourished among the masses.

Beer’s popularity has showed no sign of fading since, with global beer production reaching 1.96 billion hectoliters (hl) in 2016. China leads in beer production (460 million hl produced in 2016) followed by the US, which produced 221.25 million hl of beer in 2016.

In the last few years, the demand for craft beer—defined by the US Brewers Association as beers produced by small, independent, breweries in a traditional or innovative way—has increased significantly, both in Europe, and in the US. For example, the number of operating craft breweries in the US rose from 1,596 in 2009 to 5,234 in 2016 according to the Brewers Association, while the number of microbreweries has tripled in Europe since 2010. Paul Choueiry, manager of Les Caves de Taillevent and its recently opened craft-spirits bar, The Backroom, says, “The trend in Europe really flourished four or five years ago. I travel to Ireland almost every year, and I see that existing craft beer breweries are doubling their volume year-by-year, and new breweries are opening year-by-year.”

In Lebanon, the demand for craft beer has been growing steadily, with the last few years bringing more local success stories and a maturing market. 

It’s all about timing

For generations, the local beer market in Lebanon was dominated by Almaza, a brewery that dates back to 1933 and is estimated to produce 24 million liters annually, according to a 2013 report by BLOMINVEST titled “Lebanese Beer Market Yet to Brew.” Likewise, the range of imported beers available in Lebanon in the 1990s and early 2000s was dominated by Heineken, Corona, Efes, and Budweiser.

Craft beers were virtually unheard of in Lebanon up until 2006, when Mazen Hajjar and his partners started a microbrewery and introduced 961 to the market. (Mazen Hajjar has since sold his shares, and today the active main partner is Kamal Fayyad.) While 961 garnered a lot of attention at its launch, consumption did not pick up quickly: According to the BLOMINVEST report, 961 had only 5 percent of the total beer market in Lebanon in 2013. Speaking for 961 today, its Chief Commercial Officer Iyad Rasbey says local consumption of the beer is now at approximately 15 percent of total beer consumption in Lebanon. Rasbey explains that 10 percent of 961’s production is sold in Lebanon while the rest is exported to 12 countries across the globe, including the US.

Omar Bekdache, a former partner at 961 and current co-managing partner at Brew Inc., a brewpub in Badaro, believes the beer market in Lebanon was not mature enough back in 2006. “At that time, the majority of Lebanese consumers were not aware that there was such a wide variety of beers. Perhaps because of influence under the French mandate, Lebanese tend to drink more wine than beer, so our consumption of beer per capita is quite small when compared to most other countries, especially back then,” he recalls. According to the 2013 BLOMINVEST report, statistics placed the consumption of beer per capita in Lebanon at 5.5 liters, which is small when compared to average beer-drinking countries such as France or Italy (30 and 29 liters per capita respectively back in 2013).

Bring in the craft

Several developments have set the stage for a more dynamic beer market in Lebanon. 961 is unanimously credited with opening Lebanese eyes to the concept of craft beer. Bekdache believes it drove Almaza to diversify its beer varieties and to introduce Almaza Malt, a darker alternative to its ubiquitous pilsener, and later Almaza Light and Al Rayess beer.

When Jamil Haddad launched Colonel Beer in 2014, he says few people believed he would succeed given the small beer market in Lebanon. Haddad decided to go about things in a different way and focus on the experience as much as the product. “I focused on creating a concept around the beer, which included the beer garden, live bands, a transparent glass separated brewery, an ecofriendly setup, a bike station, a beach bar,” he says. “For me, a microbrewery should come with a concept and be an experience to succeed. When you come to Colonel, you come for the beer, as well as the experience, and this is very important.”

Haddad’s vision was realized, and today he says that Colonel, which has a capacity of 1,300 people, is full on weekends and very busy on weekdays all year long. Colonel has also made an impression among others in the industry: The Backroom’s Choueiry called the venue a “dream for a master brewer,” and Bekdache noted that “Colonel created a nice buzz around craft beer. Its setup and location really did a nice job, since they created something new.”

Kassatly Chtaura launched Beirut Beer the same year as Haddad’s Colonel, and while it is a commercial beer—not a craft one—it also played a role in expanding the Lebanese beer market. “Beirut Beer’s launch campaign was very aggressive, creating a beer buzz in Lebanon, while also adding a new variety of beer,” Bekdache says. “This variety makes consumers more willing to try new beers. I believe all this [vibe around beer] led to a bigger consumption per capita, and interest in beer. Once this interest started, distributors started looking into bringing more imported beer varieties to Lebanon.”

Rasbey says the craft beer market in Lebanon only really picked up three years ago, attributing the uptick to the young generation that travels a lot and is generally more willing to try new things.

Foreign craftiness

The introduction of new beer brands in Lebanon and the explosion of the craft-beer trend in Europe and the USA—plus the Lebanese tendency to adopt trends from abroad—created an increased demand for craft beer in Lebanon. Spirit distributors took notice. “Although we don’t have a big beer culture in Lebanon, a growing number are enjoying craft beer. We acquired new craft-beer brands, and we sell them at The Malt Gallery and have a limited distribution of them in the on-trade,” said Anthony Massoud, the managing director and owner of Etablissements Antoine Massoud. (On-trade is the alcohol that is sold in restaurants, bars, and cafes.)

Through The Backroom, which is owned by Fattal Holding, Choueiry says he is hoping to grow the craft-beer trend in Lebanon and says Fattal is importing craft beers from Ireland to sell on site and to distribute in bottles as well. The problem with serving imported craft beer on tap in Lebanon, explained Choueiry, is that the equipment is expensive and most bars cannot afford it. Even the bottled variety of imported craft beers is considered expensive, with prices starting at $8 per bottle and going up to $16. While craft beer is globally more expensive than commercial beer, due to its artisanal nature and to the higher-quality ingredients used, in Lebanon the price of importing it is added to the mix.

Meanwhile, locally produced craft beer is also on the expensive side. Bekdache explains that the extra price is for the premium quality of the beer. “Doing something artisanal means you cannot do mass volume. For example, craft beers need 15 to 30 days to brew properly and be ready for consumption, while commercial breweries need three days. If I produce commercial beer,  I will have to compromise my quality and will have to sell at a lower price,” he says. Bekdache also explains that the extra overhead expenses unique to Lebanon (such as double electricity and water bills) drive his costs up further—which is reflected in the price.   

Nevertheless, the number of bars serving imported bottled craft beer in Lebanon is on the rise, as more and more consumers demand the beverage. Locally produced craft beer, like 961, Colonel, and those produced in Brew Inc., are also finding a solid consumer base. While the trend of craft beer in Lebanon is still small, its potential seems to be quite real.

 

Moving into a new world of parliamentary participation

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At the end of February 2018, German women did it again. Chancellor Angela Merkel—supposedly the most powerful woman in the world, if one believes Forbes—won her Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party’s election overwhelmingly to form a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which had been hotly debated at the party and national level for months. Also, the candidate for the CDU’s powerful general secretary position, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, was elected by party delegates with a democratic majority of 98.87 percent. (If she ever comes to Beirut on a political visit, her name will be another tongue-twister for Lebanese anchors.)

Moreover, only days before the CDU met on February 26, Merkel had announced the names of CDU ministers in the coalition government (which at time of this writing still required internal approval of the SDP party) and named three women to be among the six CDU ministers. The SDP, meanwhile, is also led by a woman, Andrea Nahles.

When will Lebanon have a Council of Ministers with a female prime minister, a female minister of defense, and 50 percent or more women in ministerial posts?   

Let’s keep things in perspective. Numbers, it is said, do not lie. That is very useful for keeping things in perspective, especially when it comes to issues that are extremely contested and fraught with partisan interest, like gender in politics and gender relations in general. Anyone who claims to be free of bias in the issue of men and women at best deceives themselves. Men are biased in gender issues. Women are biased in gender issues. This shouldn’t surprise any woman or any man, given that the overwhelming majority of people identify themselves as either female or male, and identifying oneself is, in essence, to be biased.

As opposed to the many ideologies and biases in gender matters, simple numbers can quickly clarify a few things. Even allowing several percentage points for marginal biological and self-identification driven exceptions, global gender proportions differ only in the most minute terms among countries. At birth, boys outnumber girls by a very small margin—around 1.05 to 1—and with increasing ages, the balances slowly shift until they tilt in favor of women for groups above 55.

The equality mandate

In the big-picture sense, half of the estimated 7.5 to 7.6 billion people on earth are women. By these ratios, there is every reason for the female share of political representation and decision making to be equal to that of males in a county that is proud of its democratic system—like Lebanon, if you ask any of its overwhelmingly male political leaders. But although the two genders are about equal in numbers, women neither globally nor locally enjoy full equality in terms of healthcare, education, labor, and politics.

For the humanly foreseeable future, it is to be expected that biological gender roles will remain distinct. That, according to the ruling cultural perspective of the 21st century, makes it even more important that gaps between the genders are closed and unjust discrepancies brought down in healthcare, education, labor, and politics. Of these four realms, where gender gaps have been measured annually since 2006 in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report (GGGR), the area with the most pronounced gender inequality is politics. In the GGGR’s four categories, education and healthcare have the lowest gaps and show the most countries with inexistent or very small differences in equality. The distances increase for labor, but they are by far the largest in politics.

Put numerically, the distance between the countries with the smallest and the largest gender gap on national terms in healthcare is merely 0.062 points on a scale from zero (total inequality) to one (total equality). The gap in education attainment is for most countries similarly small and stands at 0.092 points, between 28 countries with full parity score of 1 and Malawi, ranked 126th. Between the top countries and lowest-ranked Chad (144th), the gap is much more significant, at 0.428 points.

In the labor realm, where economic participation and opportunity are measured, the distance between top country Burundi’s 0.911 score and 126th-placed Mali is 0.393 points. However, across the 18 countries with the lowest index rankings, the economic participation and opportunity gap amounts to another 0.244 points, which translates into a total top-to-bottom gap of 0.673. In the political field, the gap is a whopping 0.736 points between Iceland, topping the sub-index at 0.750 points, and 144th-ranked Yemen, with a dismal 0.014 points.

At the same time, politics is the realm where women need the most support and arguably can affect the most to change the status quo and improve realities—and relatedly, conflict management and reconstruction. This is reflected in the adoption of a resolution by the United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1325, in the year 2000 (see box). This resolution was not only approved in a unanimous vote by the 15 Security Council members at the time, it has also been translated into National Action Plans adopted by over 70 UN member countries as of the end of 2017, according to the NGO Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.

Under the influence of Resolution 1325 and also of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (adopted in 2000 for a 15-year timeframe) and Sustainable Development Goals (adopted in 2015 for the 15 years till 2030), concerted global efforts for mitigating gender inequality, in the political spheres of UN Member States and the world organization itself, have visibly increased and shown numerically measurable results.

An organizational effect on the UN level was the creation of UN Women as the international body’s consolidated entity working for the empowerment of women. Another effect was the boosting of the political participation of women in the parliaments and cabinets of member countries around the world. The Middle East and North Africa region, which had lagged behind the rest of the UN’s regions in terms of political participation of women, actually showed the largest gain percentage-wise in the political participation of women in this period, at nearly 400 percent (see graph).

Lebanon in global gender context

By the ratio of female MPs, Lebanon is one of the countries with the lowest female representation. This is fact. But whether it will remain so is very much in question. For all its specificities, communal juxtapositions, and cultural diversity, Lebanon is no different from other countries when it comes to gender ratios at birth. The question of whether the country is disadvantaged in closing the gender gap because of its political structures, or if it is merely slower than most other countries, including many Arab neighbors, in adapting to the 21st century’s global gender realities, is a matter of perspective.

Sofia Saadeh, a professor of political science at the Lebanese University and a lifelong advocate of women’s political inclusion, sees it is almost impossible for qualified and independent women to make it into Parliament under Lebanon’s confessional system of governance with patriarchal organization. “Historically, so far, we have had very few women in Parliament, and those who are there are not really there on their own merit. This is because we don’t have modern parties, but sectarian parties which are based on a patriarchal system, so unless the patriarch wants you, you are not in. In the patriarchal system, those who vote are mainly male, or [are] led by a male, so they will not easily vote for a woman,” she tells Executive.

Women who registered to run in the upcoming parliamentary elections have no misgivings about the challenges they face, and the extra barriers that stand in their way, from the lack of a quota system to the high costs and missing support that female candidates have to deal with even when registering their candidacies. But as campaigns have been getting underway for the 2018 elections, women nonetheless are appearing in unprecedented numbers and with extreme determination, sharing in interviews with Executive their aims and ambitions (see story).

There is also the matter of international support and the extension of the global pro-political participation mindset and organizational framework to Lebanon. The Special Representative of the Regional Director at UN Women, Begoña Lasagabaster, conversed with Executive in the new UN Women office across the street from the Lebanese Parliament. According to Lasagabaster, UN Women, working in coordination with the whole UN system, seeks to accompany all stakeholders in member nations, from national institutions and the public sector to civil society, and academia. This appears, in the case of Lebanon, to involve developing the national action plan for implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which calls for greater participation of women in security forces, peacebuilding, prevention of conflicts, and efforts to protect weak or disenfranchised strata of society.

In spite of Lebanon’s political system, which as Lasagabaster acknowledges, complicates the achievement of change, she expressed having a sense that the stakeholders in Lebanese institutions and society all fundamentally know that things in the country have to change in favor of increased female political participation. In her view, a transformational attitude is present in Lebanon, and change is therefore a very real possibility, as long as it is approached with sensitivity to stakeholders’ need to maintain political equilibriums and implemented in small steps—which according to her, does not need to take a lot of time.

A struggle of more than 100 years

The philosopher Aristotle said that “man is by nature a political animal.” The concept of politics has indeed been ingrained in human societies since the days of the ancient Greeks—but so has the human struggle of comprehending the sexes and their political equality. The very example of Aristotle illustrates this, as he thought men superior and rulers by nature and women inferior and men’s objects. His views on women and their political inferiority to men influenced (other male) thinkers in the advancement of male-centric civilizations over many centuries.

When the political systems that today are called liberal democracies began to take shape in the 19th century, the battle for equality had its form in the quest for female voting rights. It helps explain the enormous difficulty of this struggle that it took what were considered to be the most advanced countries of the age half a century or longer to establish female voting rights.

Ahmad Barclay & Thomas Schellen

In Great Britain, it took decades of protests and demonstrations for women to win these political rights. In Finland and the Nordic nations, which are leaders in female political participation to this day, female voting rights were established beginning in 1907. In Germany, active and passive voting rights of women were first instituted in 1918. In the United States, it took from the 1870s until 1920 for a proposed constitutional amendment prohibiting discrimination in suffrage on the basis of gender to be adopted. Even when one discounts outlier countries among parliamentary democracies that were comparatively early or late in introducing them, the implementation of female voting rights came to pass from the aftermath of World War I up to the period right after World War II.     

Ahmad Barclay & Thomas Schellen
Ahmad Barclay & Thomas Schellen

Compared to the length of the struggle for political equality in terms of women winning the right to vote, the ongoing momentum in the development of female political participation with the UN, international civil society, and many national governments as proponents, appears to be deeper, wider, and much more comprehensive than in previous periods of societal evolution.

The question is thus: Will Lebanon and its sovereign, the people, remain in denial of the many advantages that significant progress toward greater women’s inclusion in Parliament and the Council of Ministers can realize? Or, will Lebanon implement greater equality in political decision making, furthering national progress and giving hope that solutions could be found to problems that have not been solved under previous political structures? This spring, the people will give us their answer, and the world will take note.

The countdown to political progress

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This year will see some economic actors sitting in the sun. It does not require special astrological powers to predict that the first half of 2018 will be good for the bottom lines of local advertising companies, social media platforms, billboard operators, pollsters, and audiovisual companies. Driving down any urban highway or country road and browsing through their favorite media, the Lebanese political consumer is being bombarded with messages about the upcoming parliamentary elections. 

State institutions set the stage in late 2017 by booking advertising and media space for several public awareness campaigns to encourage voting. Also, since early this year, campaigns by political parties, new movements, and individual candidates are coming out in increasing numbers, as contenders enter the contest for winning public attention, and ultimately, voters. This, too, is only normal, and even gives room for hope that the next Parliament will enjoy a double blessing of greater diversity and less stagnation and political paralysis.

The May 6 vote will be important for economic and social peace and development. Lebanon’s first elections in almost a decade will be conducted under a new election law, and marks—for the first time in most citizens’ political memory—an opportunity to challenge an equilibrium of interest-mongers that has blocked the nation’s advancement internally almost as much as the external phenomena of regional violence and international power plays.   

Within the mix of election campaigning and politicians’ positioning to look attractive to voters, one novelty stands out, and could even be more hopeful than the general bombardment of promises. It is the presence of female candidates in the elections. More women have announced their candidacies—or at least their strong intent to run for Parliament—than in 2009, when the last elections were held, or in any previous election in living memory. According to figures from the Inter-Parliamentary Union, only 1.7 percent of the candidates for parliamentary elections in 2009 were women.

While no assessment of registered parliamentary candidates can be made before the official lists are published after the March 7 registration deadline, political officials in Lebanon have spoken out publicly and in interviews with Executive for more women in Parliament (the Ministry for Women’s Affairs adopted the slogan, “Half of society, half of Parliament;” see interview with Minister Oghassabian, while other sources within the political class have for several months been speaking of expectations that more women will run. No one interviewed for this article placed the figure lower than 80 women candidates.

Executive reached out to women who had announced their candidacy for the upcoming parliamentary elections in early February in an effort to gain a deeper of understanding of what motivated them to run for Parliament, and of their experience in what some prejudiced parts of society have viewed as a men’s arena for far too long.

Not new to the game

Hayat Arslan, a candidate for the Druze seat in the Chouf, says she has worked for women’s political empowerment since 2001 through an NGO called the Committee for Women’s Political Empowerment, which she founded that year to lobby for a quota for women in politics. As one of the NGOs encouraging women to run for the elections in 2013, which were later postponed, the organization counted 40 female candidates at the time, including Arslan. She says that some of these women stepped up to the plate again as soon as the current elections were announced.

Many of the female candidates that Executive spoke to built up public experience doing social work at charity organizations or NGOs, while others got their start in municipal politics. Victoria Zwein, a candidate in the Metn district, was one of the first women to run for—and win—a municipal council seat. She was elected to the municipal council in Sin El Fil, a district adjacent to Beirut, in 2004. Adding to her experience were activities in the areas of urban development and women’s empowerment, as well as projects with the international UN body ESCWA.

A breakthrough into politics on the municipal level also provided an important stepping stone for Josephine Zgheib. She is currently a municipal council member in Kfardebian, in the mountain area to the north of Beirut, where she was the first woman to win a seat, she tells Executive. Her biography also contains experience in the NGO field, through an organization she founded.

Nada Zaarour enters her race with experience in the national political scene: She is a candidate in Metn, and one of four parliamentary contenders—two women and two men—nominated in four different electoral districts by the Green Party of Lebanon. Zaarour is in her second-term as president of the Green Party of Lebanon, which was founded in 2004 to advocate for environmental protection and sustainable development, as well as human rights.

Breaking point

It is perhaps these women’s interaction with their communities’ challenges through public service work, and with the challenges of their own daily lives, that drove them to decide to run for Parliament. Kholoud Wattar, a candidate for Beirut 2, recounts an incident that occurred during her charity work, where she was trying to raise money for someone who needed urgent medical care and had to sweet-talk a certain politician to secure his help, despite the fact that healthcare is a basic right for citizens. “I decided to run for elections because I never again wanted to be in a position where I had to beg for my rights in my country,” she says. Wattar tells Executive that she aims to assemble a complete women’s list that can compete for the seats allocated to Beirut 2.

Every female candidate who spoke to Executive identified the country’s dire economic, environmental, and social state as the main motivation for their candidacies. “It’s a sin if we don’t run for Parliament in these elections because the situation in the country has become very dangerous. The level of pollution is extremely high, there is no greenery in the mountains to speak of, [and] our constitution is not being respected. We can no longer watch from the sidelines,” says Zgheib.

According to the candidates, it would be futile to complain about the political establishment’s performance without providing voters with an alternative. “The situation [in the country] has deteriorated badly, and no one has the boldness to stand up against the establishment and say enough is enough. We have reached a critical point where we either initiate positive change through this election and give future generations hope in the country to work further for it, or continue [on our current path], with generation after generation of people in the establishment holding on to power,” says Paula Yacoubian, a former political show presenter for Future TV who is running in Beirut 1 with Sabaa, a party formed last year.

Most of the women Executive profiled say they are running as independents on lists that are not from establishment political parties—groups with current representation in Parliament—but rather have been put together by coalitions of “anti establishment” political actors who come from civil society, protest movements such as the anti-garbage groups of 2015, or political backgrounds that are otherwise separate from the mainstream establishment.

While establishment political parties spoke positively about the potential increase in female candidates in the early run-up to the elections, several of them announced candidate lineups in late February that did not include a single woman. Of the three parties who announced their candidates at that time, one—Hezbollah—had already stated that it did not consider fielding female candidates to be coherent with its positions; another, the Druze-dominated Progressive Socialist Party, presented a female-free list; and the third, the Shia Amal party founded by cleric Musa al-Sadr in the 70s and for decades led by Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, announced a sole female candidate, sitting Minister of State for Administrative Reform Inaya Ezzeddine.

The difficulties that female candidates face in the machines of political parties were further illuminated at a Beirut conference about female candidacies in late January, where the overriding tenor of established parties was revealed to be power-centric, prioritizing their perceived short-term chances to win or defend parliamentary seats over the idea of diversifying their candidate lists by including more women.

Some women who were still contemplating their candidacies when they spoke to Executive said, speaking on condition of anonymity, that they had been pressured by political parties when discussing the possibility of running. One businesswoman with NGO experience who was leaning toward running as an independent revealed that a political party had pressured her to either join its list or not to run at all. This sort of behavior by political parties is hardly surprising, given that power pressures and entrenched practices in systems all over the world rarely fully deserve their “democratic” labels, but it seems specifically noteworthy in the Lebanese context because of two factors.

First, many female candidates relate more to independent agendas and feel more represented and equal in the political company of other independent candidates. “Women and men are equal as activists outside of this circle or club of politicians,” says the Green Party’s Zaarour. And Zwein, who began her political career in 2004 with the National Liberal Party that was established by the venerated politician Camille Chamoun in 1958 and has been led by his son Dory—today an octogenarian—since 1990, said she can no longer identify with a party which revolves around a patriarchal leader.

Zwein declares that she will be running with Sabaa in the parliamentary elections. “I’m a person who believes in political parties as major stakeholders for positive change in any country. But I couldn’t find any party in Lebanon which I believe I can work with. Most of the time, it’s a family business or a family political party, or it’s really extreme religion. It’s hard to believe that political parties will actually allow women to be present as ministers or as candidates, and the proof is that till now there are no women on the parties’ lists,” says Zwein.

Secondly, in cases where political parties do embrace female candidacy, the support structures for women aspiring to political roles appear to need much more development. Rindala Jabbour, a high-ranking member of the Free Patriotic Movement who won the party’s internal elections to run for parliamentary elections in West Bekaa–Rashaya, tells Executive that men and women are treated as equals in the party, but that she would have hoped for affirmative action to support qualified women like herself. “In some areas, you feel there is no difference between men and women, and it’s all about having the right personality [and skills] for politics, such as being able to negotiate and present your ideas clearly. In other regards, however, you feel that there should be some positive discrimination,” she says.

“Today, we’re fighting for women’s representation in politics in Lebanon. Thus, as a party, you should support your female members, and maybe give them some privileges over men to level the playing field, so to speak. I believe there should be some initiatives to support qualified women within their parties to help them rise to power. This is not the case, and you run for party elections like a man,” Jabbour elaborates, adding that one such initiative could be to assist female candidates with campaign financing, as she herself comes from a working-class background and not from a rich family.

Outside old boxes

Beyond the internal realities of anti-establishment movements and political parties alike, the rise of independent women in Middle Eastern politics is noteworthy on another level. This level is the political context of a region where many countries that are not equipped with one of two conventional power-transmission mechanisms.

Conventional wisdom in past research of women’s entry paths into political arenas worldwide was that overcoming gender barriers in parliaments required either the support of a political party or the presence of a gender quota, said Bozena Welborne, a researcher and professor of Middle Eastern politics and the role of women in politics at Smith College in the United States, at a conference panel on political inclusion hosted by the American University of Beirut’s Issam Fares Institute at the end of January. Curiously, this perception matrix is not necessarily as applicable in the Middle East, she explained. “The Middle East and North Africa lead the world in terms of the number of women who have been elected as independents,” she said. 

Her findings about independent female MPs in the Middle East showed that they succeeded in many countries of the region because of quotas, but without any party support. Welbourne later elaborated by email. She and a student had conducted research into the allegiances of parliamentary women in countries around the world between 2015-17.

That MENA leads the world in this regard, when seen in the context of the often weak roles of political parties in the formation of popular will in MENA countries, suggests that highly educated women with well-developed personal social networks (educators, for example) who compete for office in countries with flexible, parallel, or mixed electoral systems (thus outside of completely closed-list electoral systems), have a comparatively higher chance of succeeding as independents.

In the wider context of ongoing change in the political environments of professed democracies, the increasingly effective use of social media hints at an evolution in politics where non-party-dependent agenda-setting mechanisms and access roads to politics are gaining importance, functioning either as an alternative to or in conjunction with political parties.

Underrepresenting women in their lists might backfire on political parties, but so too might any attempts to use women as insincere tokens of pretend-equality, or stooges of interests of whatever partisan group, tribe, or sect, and not as equal decision makers. When such attempts of utilization or political exploitation of female authority are made, they are not missed by politically astute women. “Parties are choosing dull women who are not prominent in their communities to be on their lists because they don’t want women to challenge them or compete with them on the preferential vote,” Wattar notes with disdain. “These parties need to show that they have women to appear as ‘politically correct,’ but who are these women?” she asks.   

Support a sister

While encouragement for women’s participation in Lebanon’s political life has come a long way since 2004, it still has some way to go. Zwein was pregnant when she ran for municipal elections in 2004, and she recalls people telling her that she should go take care of her family instead of campaigning. Zgheib was single when she ran for municipal elections in 2010—she was the only female candidate—and people attempted to discourage her by asking her what she would do if she got married and left town. Wattar says that when she told her family that she had registered for the 2013 elections, her husband was shocked and her seven brothers threatened to disown her. For these women, things have changed a lot: Now, the three of them have the full support of their families and communities, and Zgheib proudly recounts that four women ran for the Kfardebian municipal elections in 2016.

Confirming a philosophical maxim from Friedrich Nietzsche—a man perceived as deeply misogynistic but perhaps also an indiscriminate hater of homo sapiens—that says, “What does not kill us makes us stronger,” Lebanese women in politics say they have turned the opposition to their dreams into whetting stones to hone their individual strengths. Wattar says she feels certain that she can influence a whole legislature of men just as she turned her own male relatives from opponents to supporters of female participation in politics.

 The women profiled for this article say they were largely supported by the women in their communities when they announced their candidacy. Jabbour says she was worried about the response from other women inside the party because she had the misperception that women tended to be jealous of each other’s successes, but the response was the exact opposite, and she counts the women of the FPM as her biggest allies and supporters.

Livia Bergmeijer | Executive

“Being aware of our role and power as women started with the 2013 elections, and many of the same women are running today for Parliament. So we have already started to work together and have already decided that we will empower each other. Although some of these women are from contradicting parties, we are working together for the welfare of women, and it’s amazing,” explains Wattar.

Despite progress, elements of a patriarchal mentality still abound in Lebanon, and despite the vocal support they have been given, some of the candidates Executive spoke with worry that the prevailing cultural environment will sway voters into voting for male establishment types. “Voters say they want to vote for women, but so far, the fearmongering has been stronger in instilling fear in these people that they should vote according to their sect so that the za’eem will not lose. This mentality is stronger than the motivation to have more women in Parliament and to vote for women,” says Yacoubian.   

The road of women candidates to Election Day on May 6 is by no means easy. “There are many handicaps for women running for elections. To begin with, women are not rich in their own right; their husbands, fathers, or male relatives are rich, and they prefer to spend [money] on men who are running. You also have the patriarchal mentality that still prefers men to run, not women. And you also have the media, which is very partisan and controlled by the politicians,” cautions Arslan.

The bottom line is whether female candidates—be it as full independents, anti-establishment, or establishment members—will have succeeded very convincingly or only “fought respectably” in this good fight for increased presence in Parliament.

Hopefully, Lebanon will at least move forward enough to no longer be among the countries ranked lowest for female representation in their national legislatures, a ratio that neither reflects the skill and leadership abilities nor the many achievements of Lebanese women over the decades in different areas.

The upcoming election will be a step toward better governing if it results in higher rates of  inclusion for women. Hopefully, the bedtime stories that the first-time Lebanese voters of 2018 will one day tell their granddaughters and grandsons about the political dominance of men in Parliament and cabinet will all start with, “Once upon a time … ”


Troubled waters

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A comment made by Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman at a Tel Aviv conference on January 31 sparked outrage in Lebanon, bringing the issue of the maritime border dispute between Lebanon and Israel back into the spotlight and catching Washington’s attention once again.

The Obama administration started mediating between Lebanon and Israel to help contain the dispute in 2012, but little happened on this front after President Trump took office in 2017. It seemed to all parties that mediation was no longer a priority for the US. Then, in October, during Lebanon’s first oil and gas licensing round, a consortium of companies led by France’s Total bid on Block 9, which includes a disputed maritime area. The bid rekindled interest in the dispute, but the buzz was discreet, confined to experts and diplomatic circles, until it was thrust out in the open again when Liberman described Lebanon’s offshore tender as “very provocative” and urged international companies not to bid on it, about a month and a half after licenses were awarded (see timeline).

Moving borders

The dispute goes back to December 2010, when Cyprus and Israel signed a maritime border agreement that was denounced by Lebanon because it encroached on parts of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). On July 10, 2011, the Israeli cabinet approved a map of Israel’s northern maritime border, and two days later, the Israeli mission to the UN included a list of coordinates delimiting the northern end of Israel’s territorial sea and EEZ. Some of these coordinates overlapped with the Lebanese EEZ.

But to understand how we got here, we must go back to 2007. On January 17 of that year, Lebanon signed a maritime border agreement with Cyprus. It followed the standard procedure outlined in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, marking a series of points that are equidistant from Cyprus and Lebanon known as the median line. Point 1 was used to mark the southernmost point along this line, while Point 6 marked its northernmost point. The agreement included a standard clause specifying that the coordinates of the first and last markers—in this case Points 1 and 6—may be adjusted in light of future delimitation of the EEZ with other neighboring states, since a bilateral agreement cannot define the borders of third states.

The agreement was never ratified by the Lebanese Parliament, largely because of pressure from Turkey, which denounces all maritime border agreements signed by the Republic of Cyprus with its neighboring countries. As such, the agreement never entered into force.

It wasn’t until April 2009 that a Lebanese commission tasked with defining the coordinates of Lebanon’s EEZ completed its work, identifying Point 23—17 km south of Point 1—as the southernmost point of Lebanon’s EEZ. The coordinates were approved by the cabinet on May 13, 2009 and by Parliament on August 4, 2011. In accordance with UNCLOS, Lebanon submitted the relevant charts and lists of coordinates to the UN in July and October 2010 and in November 2011. Just like Israel’s 2011 submissions, these were unilateral determinations and do not amount to border delimitation.

The question is: Why did Lebanon sign a border agreement with Cyprus in 2007, more than two years before it had a precise definition of the borders of its EEZ?

israel’s opening

While the Lebanon–Cyprus agreement was never ratified and did not reflect Lebanon’s final position on the southern boundary of its EEZ, it did provide Israel with an opening. In December 2010, Israel signed a similar offshore border agreement with Cyprus. This deal ignored the coordinates that had been declared by Lebanon and sent to the UN a few months prior, instead using Point 1—the southernmost marker referenced in the 2007 Lebanese–Cypriot agreement—as the northernmost marker in the Israeli–Cypriot agreement. It allowed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to say in July 2010 that “the outline that Lebanon submitted to the UN … conflicts with the line that we have agreed upon with Cyprus and—what is more significant in my eyes—it conflicts with the line that Lebanon itself agreed upon with Cyprus in 2007.”

While Israel objected to the southernmost coordinates submitted by Lebanon, less known is the fact that Syria also objected to the delineation provided by Lebanon. In a letter transmitted to the UN Secretary-General on July 15, 2014, Syria stated that the delineation does not have “any binding legal effect on other states. It remains only a notification, and one to which the Syrian Arab Republic objects.” This could open Lebanon to similar dispute with Syria in the future.

Of course, the Israeli–Cypriot agreement, like the Lebanese–Cypriot agreement before it, included the standard clause specifying that the geographical coordinates of the first and last markers may be adjusted in light of future delimitation of the EEZ with other neighboring states. This left room to maneuver.

The overlap is a triangle around 856 square kilometers in size that widens as it goes further out to sea. According to Frederic Hof, the first US mediator to be involved in the EEZ disagreement, disputes of this nature are common, and “both sides acted professionally in their calculations and performed in ways fully consistent with customary international practice.”

American mediation

Because Israel is not a signatory to UNCLOS and because of the political situation between Lebanon and Israel, a third-party mediation was the optimal choice to try to find a solution to the dispute. Cyprus offered its services a couple of times, but the Americans were the first to submit a potential resolution to the impasse. Hof presented a plan in May 2012 to create a provisional but legally binding maritime separation line and a buffer zone with no petroleum activities. According to media reports, it acknowledged that around 500 square kilometers of the disputed area belong to Lebanon. It received mixed reactions in Lebanese media but was neither approved nor officially rejected at the time.

Amos Hochstein, the deputy US assistant secretary of state for energy diplomacy, took over Hof’s mediation efforts at the end of 2012. In Beirut, the handoff was seen as an opportunity to put Hof’s plan aside and seek more favorable proposals. In November 2013, Hochstein reportedly submitted to Lebanese officials a plan to draw a maritime “blue line” similar to the one established by the UN in June 2000 to demarcate the Lebanese-Israeli land border. The line would be temporary in nature and was meant to curtail tension between the two countries by prohibiting any exploration within the disputed area until a solution is reached. The plan made room for a limited role for the UN, acknowledging a Lebanese demand to involve the UN in the process. It was seen as a good starting point in Lebanon but was not met with enthusiasm in Israel. Frequent power vacuums in Lebanon did not help. By the time Lebanon had fully functioning institutions, with a new president in Baabda in October 2016 and a new cabinet in December 2016, the end of the Obama administration was only weeks away, bringing with it the end  of Hochstein’s mediation. The Trump administration had other priorities, and didn’t actively involve itself on the subject until recently. A week after Liberman’s comments in December 2017, Acting US Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield visited Lebanon in preparation for Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s visit to Beirut on February 15. The US appeared to be dusting off the Hof plan, and Beirut was not thrilled. Lebanon made a counter-proposal to demarcate the border via a trilateral committee including Lebanese, Israeli, and UN representatives, in addition to experts and American diplomats—a procedure similar to the one used in 2000 to demarcate the land border known as the Blue Line. (The offshore extension is now being referred to as the White Line.) But both the US and Israel prefer to keep any UN role minimal.

For now, there is a lack of urgency in Beirut to settle the dispute—or, more precisely, to move forward with plans that seem unfavorable to Lebanon, now that Block 9 has been awarded and actual escalation is not expected, given that it is likely not in the interest of any party. The awarding of Block 9 and the upcoming exploratory activities within it were what triggered the Israeli comments at the end of January.

Block 9 covers 1742 square kilometers, out of which around 145 square kilometers (around 8 percent) fall within the disputed area. At the official signing ceremony for the exploration and production agreement on February 9, Total’s Stéphane Michel confirmed that the company’s target for drilling in Block 9 is going to be in the northern part of the block, some 25 km away from the disputed area. It is hoped that this will contain tension and allow the company to proceed with its work undisturbed. But will it be enough? Total has committed to drilling at least one well in Block 9. Failing to drill will incur a penalty worth tens of millions of dollars. But it’s not uncommon for a company to take that hit if it estimates that a penalty is less costly than drilling. In fact, in early 2015, just before the discovery of Zohr, a large natural-gas field off the coast of Egypt, reignited interest in the region, Total failed to proceed with its commitments in Cyprus and relinquished Block 10 without drilling any well.

Until next year, then, all eyes will be on the political actors in this tale.

A community effort

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Executive sat down with the country’s first-ever minister of state for women’s affairs, Jean Oghassabian. The ministry was launched one year ago with a mandate to empower and protect women and promote and develop gender equality in Lebanon.

E   This is the first term for you as minister of women’s affairs and, in fact, the first time that a women’s affairs ministry has existed in Lebanon. Why was there a need for such a ministry?

This ministry was formed because Prime Minister [Saad Hariri] is convinced that [women’s rights] need to be put in the spotlight [as issues] related to human values and respect for all people. This ministry is showing that women’s rights are the responsibility of the whole society, and men should participate on many levels to reach complete equality because, for me, women’s issues are not limited to women only. For that reason, the prime minister, with the approval of the president of the republic, decided to establish this ministry.

What I tried to do [during my term in office to date] is to create momentum all over the country. I always wanted to prove that the Lebanese woman has huge capacity and potential. As she has succeeded in the private sector in all levels and industries, she also has the capability to succeed in [state] institutions. For the upcoming elections, we have a campaign [to increase] female involvement in politics. We conducted a conference, and [recently] organized a workshop for [female] candidates in the elections, [both for] candidates representing political parties and for independent candidates. We have a media campaign, “Half of society and half of Parliament,” and, so far, I have attended maybe 15 to 18 conferences everywhere in Lebanon to promote the idea that women in Lebanon have potential. When we talk about half of society, it’s not a question of number; it’s a question of power. It is a question of the future. If you don’t have women in Parliament, it’s not [only] a loss for women; it is a loss for Parliament, a loss for the government, and a loss for the whole country, because the country is not benefiting from a big part of the potential [that exists].

E   You say that there has been progress, but what guarantees do the Lebanese people have that this ministry will continue to exist after the elections and the formation of the new cabinet?

This is a question that is even asked by different stakeholders in Lebanon working on women’s issues, such as UN agencies, NGOs, embassies, and donors. I could perhaps accept such a question if upon my appointment as minister I had said, “Okay, I am a minister now, [so] I will have one assistant and [do the bare minimum] of work on my own.” [In such a case], the new government might just say, “We don’t have a [real women’s affairs] ministry,” and it would be completely neglected [after the next elections]. But this is not the case. Actually, we have established a complete ministry with staff, with a budget, and with a lot of projects in process of being implemented. We have a lot of upcoming projects with international donors such as the World Bank, UN, ESCWA, UN Women, and many embassies. We have so far [presented] six amendments to [existing] laws and [drafted] new laws.

E   Aside from the promotion of female candidacies in the upcoming parliamentary elections, what has the ministry been doing to encourage and develop greater participation of women in the overall public sector in Lebanon?

I proposed to the prime minister and to the government to have a quota in all the nominations of the boards in different institutions. To date, in all these nominations issued under the current cabinet, we [had a] minimum [of] 25 percent of women nominees in security institutions. The judiciary [and] the committee controlling the elections have  28 percent women, and in the Economic and Social Council of Lebanon we have 27 percent female representation.

E    That is achieved by having a quota system?

It’s not by law, but it’s a decision taken by the government because I pushed this issue, and we are following up on that. Every time [the government] has to make appointments to any public position, we should have minimum 30 percent women; we reached 25 to 27 percent, but we are going up.

E   And are there any data indicators that you look at for measuring the achieved progress in ensuring women’s rights?

Now we are working with ESCWA Women, UNFPA, the Ministry of Justice, and with the Central Administration of Statistics [to establish] indicators, and also to study the impact of [gender-based] violence on society, as a societal issue and as an economic and educational issue.

E   So, if we talk about crimes against women, have you seen an increase in the number of reported cases?

Yes. Many more people are now reporting, but we may have [incidents of] violence that nobody knows about, because, in some societies or some families, [people] don’t want to talk about [such incidents]. This goes back to cultural issues, and it is for this reason that I decided to educate primary school children from the ages of 10 to 12, or even eight years old, on the negative effects that violence against women has on family relations. We prepared the concept note and are talking to various [potential] donors about it.

E   Is it correct to say that this is a project that is not yet being implemented today, and that you are looking for funding from international sources?

We are looking for funding, and we can find it, because, as I mentioned in the beginning, there are a lot of donors who are willing to fund [projects of] this ministry. The budget that I have from the government is only a working budget: I can cover  salaries and some small expenses, but the projects are financed by donors. I decided to establish this ministry as a UNDP program. For that reason, I [was able] to move quickly in everything. This [collaboration] also gives me credibility in front of international agencies and donors. I had the ability to [organize] all this in a short time because I was the minister for administrative reform in 2005. [The Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform] is also a UNDP program which gets working capital from the government and ensures the funding of the other projects from donors.

I also worked with international donors in the private sector on many projects related to public sector improvement. This gave me some knowhow to move quickly, and also to benefit from all assets that are available inside the country. But if they had brought somebody that is not “in the business” as a minister, he would have taken time to learn all these issues. I think that we have a lot of achievements that will guarantee that this ministry will be permanent and sustainable. As a lot of involvement in many projects with international donors is at hand today, I think that any consideration [to terminate the ministry] by the coming government would be a mistake and send a very bad message to the international community.

E   Moving forward, what is the ministry’s legislative roadmap?

I do my homework. So far, I succeeded in getting the approval of the government for three amendments. The first is to punish sexual harassment. It has not been approved by the Parliament yet, but it is not easy to get approval. It will take three to four months because it has to be approved by all ministries and by Ministry of Justice and the legislative council. This one was approved by the cabinet, [as was] the amendment to eliminate discrimination in the provisions of the social security law. [Also] we have the three-day paternity leave. People told me it doesn’t work. I said for me it is not question of three days; it’s a question of creating a new culture and convictions that the father has the same responsibilities as the woman when the child is born and not only logistical responsibilities. 

Making the most of it

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Amartya Sen, the Indian economist and philosopher, wrote in a 2001 essay that in a world afflicted with “the deeply unequal sharing of the burden of adversities between women and men,” gender inequality must be understood as a “collection of disparate and interlinked problems.”

Gender inequality is reflected in laws, regulations, rights, norms, responsibilities, and opportunities. The World Economic Forum (WEF) has issued Global Gender Gap Reports (GGGR) since 2006, aiming to measure gender gaps in four key areas: health, education, economics, and politics. It found in its latest GGGR last year that “gaps between women and men on economic participation and political empowerment remain wide.” According to the WEF, recent years have even seen a partial reverse in what had been a slow but steady trend of closing gender gaps worldwide over the past decade.

In the economic sphere, gender gaps include painful inequalities in labor force participation, with a global average of 54 percent of women actively involved in the workforce, compared to 81 percent of men. Also, women earn on average 50 percent less than their male counterparts, despite the fact that they work longer hours, and do most of the unpaid labor, like household work and child care.

Gender inequality also impacts entrepreneurship. Research has shown that the number of female entrepreneurs is still lagging behind in most countries, but especially so in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. According to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2016 gender report, women in the MENA region run established businesses at one-third of the rate of men. Moreover, women start new businesses at less than 60 percent of the rate of their male counterparts. The report measures these discrepancies based on the so-called total entrepreneurial activities of individuals in the working age population (18–64 years). Moreover, the report finds that women-led businesses are 60 percent more likely to remain a single-person firm, and only one in 10 female entrepreneurs expect their business to grow in the coming years.

Looking only at these stark percentages gives a grim image of the immense detriment that gender inequality poses for women in entrepreneurship, but this is not the whole story. Research on entrepreneurship in the region indicates that the effects of gender inequality are more complex. A look at several important elements for entrepreneurs reveals a picture of women determined to overcome the disadvantages under existing gender gaps by venturing into self-determined entrepreneurial careers, and thus, becoming pioneers and role models for societal change. Limiting our view of female entrepreneurship in the MENA region to just the percentage of the gender gap might distract from very encouraging developments taking place in the region.

Self-confident women

The majority of women-led entrepreneurial projects in the region are opportunity-based innovative ventures with high market and growth potential. The region has a large reservoir of highly educated women: 38 percent of its researchers are female, a significantly higher percentage than the 30 percent ratio found in the rest of the world. Generally, researchers are an important source of innovation. The region also hosts a high number of female internet entrepreneurs: 35 percent, compared to 10 percent worldwide.

Women in this region have been able to derive business opportunities from this challenging environment, and many of the business models they have developed involve empowering others. For example, Ayah Bdeir, who is Lebanese, created  littleBits, easy-to-use, open source, modular electronic building blocks for prototyping and learning that enable users to develop their own innovations. Rana Chmaitelly, the founder of The Little Engineer, was concerned about her own kids’ addiction to smartphone technology, so she created workshops that engage kids with science, engineering, and technology. Many successful female entrepreneurs in the region develop business models that solve social and environmental issues while creating economic opportunities, such as using plastic trash to develop furniture in Hend Riad’s Reform Studio in Cairo.

Moreover, it appears that the unfavorable environment functions as a catalyst for many women as it increases their intention to become entrepreneurs. This is rooted in women’s widespread dissatisfaction with their current situations and the discriminatory working conditions that limit  their career paths in established organizations. Besides the glass ceilings that limit women’s opportunities, gender stereotypes against employed women as well as discriminating labor laws and limited job opportunities motivate some women to start their own business.

The gendered workplace context does not leave too many conventional opportunities for women, so, many create their own opportunities. This might stem from a strong sense of self-confidence among women entrepreneurs in the region. Worldwide, women have been found to have little self confidence in their entrepreneurial abilities and potential—regardless of their educational background—compared to their male counterparts. But while female self-confidence levels differ from country to country, research published in 2012 found that Lebanese women entrepreneurs were among the most self-confident globally, together with women in Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Contrary to women entrepreneurs, who take significant risks to launch themselves into freelance careers, gender inequality was shown to have the opposite effect on many men. In societies where men hold the position of decision-maker and breadwinner in a family, they are less likely to invest in the uncertain future of a new business. This is especially true in Gulf countries, where starting a small business does not afford social status. Instead, the most prized jobs, with higher salaries and benefits, can be found in public administration. Men in the Gulf region tend to start a business only when they are unable to secure a public appointment. In that sense, gender inequality takes its toll on male entrepreneurial potential in the region as well.

International findings have shown that the likelihood to start a venture increases with the presence of entrepreneurial role models and exposure to supportive social networks. However, in highly gendered societies, women entrepreneurs still depend primarily on non-professional networks, notably family and close friends, as research on Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan, Bahrain, and the UAE shows.

Building networks

The lack of exposure to professional social networks and the reliance on private networks like families, is mostly tied to cultural and social restrictions on women’s mobility and interaction with males outside their families. Thus, there remains a great need for professional support systems that can introduce women to vital connections in the wider social space. Such support systems can open doors for women to meet potential collaborators, customers, and suppliers, in addition to providing mentoring and professional advice.

Therefore, women-centric networking and professional organizations like the Arab Women Organization, the Bahrain Businesswomen’s Society, or the Lebanese League for Women in Business (LLWB), are pivotal in enhancing leadership and entrepreneurial skills. LLWB, for example, offers networking events, mentoring, training, and lobbies the government for women’s rights and development.

In the economies of Middle Eastern countries, where economic progress is a predictor of female empowerment and higher rates of entrepreneurship, gender inequality has not deterred female entrepreneurs. Although gender equality still has a long way to go in the region, evidence suggests that women in the Middle East and North Africa remain determined to carve out a significant space for their inclusion in the economy and polity of their countries through entrepreneurial leadership.

The new PPP law

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Previous experience in a number of countries has proven that public-private partnerships (PPP) are an efficient method for developing long-term infrastructure projects. Under a PPP model, the government remains focused on its primary regulatory role, while the private sector injects funds and expertise into developing projects for the benefit of the government and, ultimately, the public. One of the main factors of a successful PPP is the existence of a legal regime based on the principles of transparency, competitiveness, and accountability.

After a decade of delays, the enactment of Law No. 48 on  September 7, 2017 will undoubtedly create new prospects for the implementation of PPPs in Lebanon for both existing and future projects. The enactment of the law cannot be dissociated from the upcoming international donors conference, Cédre, which is scheduled for April 6 in Paris for the purpose of supporting the Lebanese economy, and in particular for the financing of infrastructure projects in Lebanon—expected at around $16 billion over a period of 10 years.

The law introduced a new legal regime for PPP projects in Lebanon, replacing the traditional procurement processes, which suffered from weak transparency, competitiveness, and accountability standards. The PPP law renames the “High Council for Privatization,” a ministerial committee, to the “High Council for Privatization and PPP,” and grants the council the power to assess and evaluate potential PPP projects. Once a PPP project is identified by the council, a PPP project committee will be established to study the technical, economic, legal, and financial aspects of the project, and to determine the criteria for qualifying the private partner. The PPP law stipulates the main mandatory provisions that must be included in the PPP agreement governing the contractual relationship between the public and private parties, and defines the procedures that should be applied by each party and their obligations. Therefore, the private partner is provided with sufficient clarity and visibility on the implementation of the project.

In addition, the PPP law provides that the private partners must submit both a technical and financial proposal, and that at least three offers will have to qualify, or the project will be reopened for another round of bidding, ensuring equality among the bidders and creating fair competition. Moreover, it is worth nothing that the appointment of experts and consultants to support a PPP tender may be based either on the provisions of the Lebanese Public Accounting Law or, if available, the relevant internal regulations of the High Council for Privatization and PPP, or the relevant state authority that is involved in the tender. This possibility provides for additional flexibility in terms of developing the necessary tender resources.

Private sector knowhow

The PPP law is expected to create a favorable environment for the private sector to invest in infrastructure projects in Lebanon. The private sector will be keener to enter into partnerships with the Lebanese government and to provide much-needed funding when the partnership is governed by a strong legal framework that protects their interests. In this respect, the country will benefit from the private sector’s knowhow and managerial skills, contributing to the efficient development of infrastructure projects in Lebanon. In addition, the adoption of the PPP law will play an important role in attracting foreign investments and international funding opportunities. And most importantly, PPP projects are expected to create job opportunities in various sectors in Lebanon, and hence ultimately increase revenues and stimulate economic growth.

Nevertheless, the PPP law includes certain gaps that must be bridged. For example, the law does not provide for a specific time frame between a PPP project proposal and the signature of a PPP agreement between the parties, which may discourage the private sector if the process is unreasonably lengthy. In addition, the law does not deal with PPP financing, although this is a crucial element in large-scale and long-term projects. Moreover, there is no local content requirement, like a provision requiring PPP projects to employ a minimum percentage of Lebanese nationals. In addition, the law does not stipulate that the PPP agreement should include stabilization clauses that consist of contractual clauses to protect the private party from any future changes in legislation after the execution of the contract with the public party, which are considered an important protection mechanism for the private partner against the discriminatory power of the government. Foreign investors will certainly request the insertion of such clauses to protect their investments from unexpected changes in applicable laws after they inject large capital and invest skills and intellectual property in the development of a PPP project. 

There is a substantial need for the development of infrastructure projects in Lebanon in various fields: water, electricity, waste management, healthcare, and many others. The new law is largely compliant with international standards and provides the private sector with a basic framework to enter into PPPs, and hence, increase private investments in infrastructure projects. However, the gaps highlighted above should be urgently addressed by the Council of Ministers through regulatory decrees, which will, along with the law, constitute a comprehensive legal framework for PPPs in Lebanon.

A nudge in the right direction

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From preventing simple traffic violations to curbing rampant corruption, ensuring compliance with the rule of law in Lebanon is a serious challenge for policymakers. Heavy-handed controls often do not work, as they rely on individuals making rational decisions, and financial incentives are not sustainable in the long-run. What else can the government do to improve compliance and promote a rule-of-law culture?

Part of the answer lies in a concept known as nudging: using cost-effective policy tools to steer people in the right direction by making small changes in the environment, without restricting their freedom of choice. Effective nudges include placing healthy food items at eye level in cafeterias to increase healthy eating habits, telling households about their neighbor’s energy-consumption levels to encourage them to reduce their own consumption, or texting parents about their children’s progress in school to engage them in their kids’ academic performance. The trick to getting people to change their behavior is, as the 2017 economics Nobel laureate Richard Thaler put it, to “make it easy.”

Irrational beings

The theory behind nudging integrates psychology and other insights from behavioral sciences into policymaking, designing policies with realistic assumptions about how people behave.

Classical economic theory is premised on the core belief that humans are rational and base their choices on unbiased beliefs. But books such as “Nudge” by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein and “Thinking Fast and Slow” by Daniel Kahneman question that rationality, and provide much of the intellectual backbone for nudging in the past decade.

Former UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s Behavioral Insights Team was the first government agency focussed on nudging, or nudge unit, in the world, and was soon followed by other governments, including former US President Barack Obama’s Social and Behavioral Science Team. In the region, Qatar’s Behavioral Insights Unit led the way in 2016 and was soon followed by Lebanon and Kuwait; Saudi Arabia, among others, is looking to create its own unit in the future. This global explosion of nudge units is driven by the desire to experiment with what works—data-backed interventions—in policy areas such as health, education, inclusion, and finance, rather than rely on intuition.

The impact of such interventions is tested through randomized controlled trials, a common experimentation method traditionally used in clinical trials. Lebanon’s first nudge unit, Nudge Lebanon, has tested numerous small behavioral interventions and demonstrated the profound impact it has on increasing citizen compliance with the law.

In one experiment, Nudge Lebanon partnered with Electricité du Liban to improve timely payment of electricity bills in Saida by sending customers letters informed by behavioral psychology. Among the intervention letters was one that read, “Your country needs you. Be a good citizen and pay your due electricity bill on time,” priming people’s sense of patriotism. Another informed people when 90 percent of their neighbors had already paid, asking if they wanted to join them. These nudges increased timely payment by 15 percent and 13 percent respectively, compared to the control group.

Nudge experiments

In an experiment aimed to encourage drivers and passengers to fasten their seatbelts, hotel valet parking attendants delivered a verbal prompt, “Be safe; please don’t forget to put on your seatbelt.” This increased  the number of those who wore their seatbelt by 82.8 percent compared to the control group. Another experiment reduced the amount of plastic cutlery that restaurants gave out with delivery orders by 79 percent simply by asking people if they actually wanted them.

Other nudge experiments currently underway include efforts to increase payments in Lebanese lira (in line with the central bank’s strategy to reduce dollarization in Lebanon), promote voluntary compliance with the smoking ban in restaurants, reduce illegal u-turns, and encourage victims and witnesses of government corruption to report these incidents and seek legal advice.

Many of Lebanon’s policy challenges have underlying behavioral roots that cannot be addressed with traditional tools: for example, people might have limited willpower to act on their intentions. Policy levers like command and control—threatening punishment to secure compliance—or financial incentives and subsidies fall short in addressing these behavioral pitfalls. Nudging people in the right direction using simple changes in context can help close the gap between people’s intentions and actions.

These evidence-based methods have their efficiency gains for government as well: They could nudge citizens into complying with traffic rules and regulations, bring in much-needed cash flow by increasing on-time payments of taxes and utility bills, get people to save more for their pensions using default rules (rather than relying on people to opt-in to pension schemes), and encourage regular health checks with timely reminders via SMS. While these interventions might not solve all the problems plaguing Lebanon, they can provide inexpensive, measurable improvements that can be built on in the future.

The petroleum legislative framework for Lebanon

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Now that Lebanon has signed the first two exploration and production agreements (EPAs) for offshore oil and gas, companies will prepare the groundwork to start drilling at the beginning of 2019. This achievement is a long time coming. The first oil-related legislation, the Offshore Petroleum Resources Law, was enacted in 2010; the sector’s regulator, the Lebanese Petroleum Administration, started operating back in 2012; the block delineation and the model EPA were enacted as decrees in January 2017, almost four years after they were first drafted; and the petroleum-income tax law—a necessity to complete the Lebanese petroleum fiscal regime—was enacted in October 2017, two years after it was first drafted.

This process has taken far too long. Egypt started production of the giant Zohr gas field within three years of finding it. But the constant delays that Lebanon’s oil and gas sector witnessed over the past years—very much interconnected to major regional crises—should not be the reason for interest groups such as Lebanese Oil and Gas Initiative (LOGI) to be blasé when evaluating the current efforts to complete the legal foundations of the sector, which are a prerequisite for a successful, well governed, well invested, and regulated sector. The late arrival of LOGI to the game does not mean the work that has been done over several years needs to be halted because LOGI thinks so.

There are still very important laws that need to be enacted to promote confidence in the Lebanese petroleum investment climate, ensure transparency toward the public—the ultimate owner of any resources found—and lay down solid legal and governance foundations for operating the sector. Four important laws are currently at the initial stages of the parliamentary process: They cover the establishment of a petroleum asset-management department, a sovereign wealth fund (which this author helped draft), and a national oil company, as well as prospects for onshore exploration. The proposed legislation is not being hurried through Parliament, but rather is being discussed at length in subcommittees. The fact that Lebanon currently has the right set of circumstances to make up for the years that we missed should not be mistaken for the conspiracy theory that the laws are being rushed.

These laws have been prepared by very capable Lebanese policymakers and legislators for more than two years. It is vital in any policymaking process to involve interest groups, the media, civil society, and independent experts. It is also essential that Lebanon not fall into the trap of the resource curse, a situation where countries rich in resources tend to have poorer economic growth, flawed democracies, and less development than those without. Interest groups and experts are rightfully highlighting the risks—however, they should know that these laws have been proposed to protect us from the resource curse, and so should be careful about what kind of messages they are trying to send to the public. Halting the laws is not the solution, reaching out to the legislators behind them and providing constructive comments is far more useful. Joining in the efforts to achieve the ideal legislative framework is more productive than campaigning against the need for new laws.

Additionally, last year’s Right of Access to Information law, the Petroleum Transparency Law—which is reaching the final stages in parliament committees—and the plan to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative will all contribute to the transparency of the sector.

The Lebanese economy has struggled for many decades to overcome various internal and external hurdles on the path to proper growth, and is currently at a quarter of its true potential. The proposed petroleum-related laws are important building blocks toward this holistic approach, and there is no shortage of talent in Lebanon to achieve the vision we all share.

 

Here is a summary of the four laws that have recently been referred to parliamentary committees with a brief explanation of why they are essential:

 

1. Petroleum Asset Management Department (PAD) Law: This law would establish a new department under the Ministry of Finance with two major duties. The first is to assist the Minister of Finance in drawing up an investment mandate for the sovereign wealth fund (SWF), which would then need to be approved by both the Council of Ministers and Parliament. Following best practice worldwide, the investment mandate would be a technical document prepared by experts at the Ministry of Finance and approved by the government, setting out general guidelines for the SWF in the context of Lebanon’s macroeconomic policy, including risk tolerance of the investment choices. The role of the SWF is to manage the funds and not to design fiscal or investment policies; the investment mandate, prepared worldwide by policymakers at the Ministry of Finance, presented by the minister, and approved by government, is designed to ensure the SWF is in line with the central government’s vision for the economy. The second role of the PAD is to audit the companies operating in the petroleum industry to ensure the proper collection of the 20 percent income tax. Auditing petroleum activities is a new responsibility for Lebanon, and the proper experts should be hired to support the MoF in its revenue collection role.

2. Sovereign Wealth Fund Law: The cost of debt in Lebanon has become very high, and economic fundamentals would suggest that debt should be paid down with any influx of extra government funds before attempting to generate higher returns in financial markets. But this logic is flawed and dangerous in the context of Lebanon. The problems of chronic debt, lack of investment in infrastructure, failing public services, and high yearly deficit are not caused by a lack of funds, so using income from petroleum activities to pay down the debt is not the solution.

Public-private partnerships can resolve the infrastructure and public-services problem, while cutting non-productive subsidies and improving the tax-collection system can solve the chronic deficit and debt problem. Income from non-renewable resources should be turned into off-balance-sheet renewable financial resources for future generations, to be used only under strict terms and in the right sectors of the economy.

The current draft of the SWF law has very strict fiscal rules for spending, and only allows minor alleviation of the debt burden in the specific case where the government has turned its chronic deficit problem into a debt-sustainable primary surplus—a major achievement, if it were to take place. More importantly, the law ensures checks and balances based on the best corporate governance practices, helping the board of the fund, the finance minister, the cabinet, Parliament, internal auditors, two external auditors, the PAD, and the SWF management interact without overstepping their responsibilities. Moreover, it ensures full transparency of operations by publishing all reports online.

It will take several years to have an able home-grown team in place to manage such a fund, so any delay now will be magnified down the road. The tens of millions of dollars already generated by selling geophysical data to companies could be the seed money for the fund. Lebanon has always been a borrowing country, so launching a culture of savings is important. The fear of building new institutions, overstaffing them, and causing wasteful spending is justified, given the weak corporate governance practices in Lebanon, but should not be a reason to choose the do-nothing approach. Rather, it should encourage a do-it-right approach.

3. National Oil Company (NOC) Law: This law does not establish the NOC, but rather organizes its corporate governance, defines the participation methodology of the government, and starts consolidating government oil and gas assets under one legal entity. The law clearly states that the NOC will be established in accordance with the 2010 Offshore Petroleum Resources Law (OPRL), which states it must be established by a cabinet decree—and after the proof of commerciality, not right away, as some misinformed experts suggested. Hence, this law would send the proper signal to international oil companies about the methodology of government participation. The objective is to be transparent about the incentives of the government in future licensing rounds since the participation method of the state will impact the economics of future exploration and production agreements.

4. Onshore Exploration Law: As the OPRL covers only offshore exploration, production, and decommissioning activities, a legislative framework is clearly missing for any onshore activities, which are usually very different in nature, but equally important to organize the activities of the sector as a whole. This law would set the scope of onshore activities including development, production and decommissioning, the ownership of resources, the methodology for land expropriation, the participation of the state, the role of different government entities, and the preservation of any cultural or historic heritage, among other important components that the OPRL similarly covers.

A fund manager’s dream

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The MIC in MIC Ventures is not short for Mission Impossible, Cruise. But it could be. Khaled Zeidan, the managing director of MIC Ventures, could easily have a second career modeling cool shades, and the chosen mission of MIC Ventures, should it succeed, will bring life to a sector whose true potential in Lebanon has lain dormant for the past 15 years or more.

This sector is information and communications technology (ICT). MIC Ventures approaches mainly local ICT investment opportunities with a $48 million war chest. Over the next four years, it aims to deploy this money through investments into Lebanese companies with value-add potential, mainly in four verticals: fintech in all its varieties, gaming (including anything virtual reality), content, and logistics and delivery. Beyond ICT companies and value-creation opportunities related to these verticals, MIC Ventures (MICV) also looks at opportunities that have an internet of things angle—for example, in agriculture, Zeidan explains.   

According to him, MICV, as a venture capital fund company, has a projected lifecycle of seven years, during which it wants to add value to companies in the tech entrepreneurship sector, to the Lebanese economy, and to the two equal owners after which it is named: MIC 1 and MIC 2, better known in the market under their associated mobile communications brands, Alfa and touch.

These fine bureaucratic twins called MIC have carried superbly ironic—but not by design—names of Mobile Interim Company 1 and Mobile Interim Company 2 since they were reborn in the early 2000s to succeed the former Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) companies FTML (operating under brand name Cellis) and Libancell. BOT, the period’s fashionable version of a public-private partnership, was the model the Lebanese state under the late Rafik Hariri had embarked on from 1993 to 1994, through a highly successful rollout of second-generation GSM cellular services.

A tangled past

With FTML and Libancell, the Lebanese telecommunications sector had been blooming and innovating at levels head and shoulders above all other Arab countries between 1994 and about 2002. But on this path of strong growth, the mobile communications duo—and de-facto duopoly—were also accused of being corrupt and characterized as illegitimate profit-reaping corporate monsters. The Lebanese Republic first unilaterally changed and then terminated their BOT agreements in mid-2001 and took ownership of the networks as state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

Costly rebranding and years of languishment and backsliding in mobile communications rankings were to follow. Soon, the only narratives of note to surround the political-economy animals MIC 1 and 2 and the entire Lebanese telecoms sector were, from about 2002 to 2016, anti-strategic stories of arbitration, temporary management contracts, failed privatization attempts or aborted auctions to sell off telecoms licences, general lack of innovation, and allegations of corruption, criminal activity, and shady deals by even shadier figures hiding behind certain desks at the Ministry of Telecommunications (MOT).

The new chapter in the narrative of Lebanese ICT—one that MICV is a key part of—began with a round-table meeting organized by Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s economic team about a year ago. A number of ideas and proposals for invigorating sectors in the Lebanese economy were discussed, and among the ones contributed by Zeidan was the idea of a fund under the ownership of the two mobile SOEs, MIC 1 and MIC 2.

Zeidan’s proposal was founded on the reasoning that telecom operators had missed many value-generation opportunities as they generally had “stopped innovating” in the rapidly changing ICT environment about a decade after mobile communication’s hyperactive growth years in the 90s and early 2000s, when cellular license auctions made top news and mobile companies were as hyped as today’s behemoths, Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon (GAFA).

Besides the rise of these online giants, a lot has changed in mobile communications in terms of technology, user experience, and user behavior—and mobile providers had to transform accordingly. Voice traffic is the opposite of a growth engine; data accounts for most activities in mobile communications. Regional operators such as Zain Group (formerly MTC) of Kuwait and Riyadh-based STC set up their own venture capital funds or comparable initiatives earlier this decade, seeking to compete with mobile-tech investments by other players such as large funds by conventional VCs or GAFA.

The bold idea

By Zeidan’s reasoning, the general logic of mobile operators’ need to invest in innovative companies applies to the Lebanese market, but with the twist that Lebanon is late to this particular game and that the ICT niche has not been covered in the rising entrepreneurship ecosystem. He explains that many companies in this specialty space already exist, have operational revenues, and could rise on steady growth trajectories over time with the help of capital injections. They face barriers on this path, however, because their service orientation or projected growth profiles do not make them top targets for funds organized under the central bank’s Circular 331, he claims.

“I made a recommendation to set up a fund that invests in those companies and builds a partnership between them and the two MICs,” Zeidan says, based on the notion that the two MIC entities could benefit substantially from having access to product and service offerings produced by companies funded with their investments.

The plan for this fund was discussed by stakeholders and simmered for several months while its progenitors, including Zeidan, went looking for a person to assume full mental ownership as fund manager. “I was not supposed to manage this fund. I worked on this fund with the intention of having somebody else manage it,” he says.

After leaving his job as head of BankMed Group’s investment banking firm Medsecurities in the middle of 2017, Zeidan shelved plans for a personal sabbatical and instead engaged more deeply with the fund project plan starting in around September. In the following months, he gained stakeholders’ trust, he says, including people at the two mobile networks’ operators, Alpha and touch, but still could not find a person willing to run the fund. “I pitched a lot of managers to take on this fund, but nobody accepted the job because they thought it was a pipedream,” he tells Executive.

A decision to set up the fund was taken with the support of political stakeholders around last October. In November, the fund project presumably passed through a patch of deepest political darkness along with the whole of Lebanon. Then came the miraculous resuscitation of the Hariri government, and toward the end of last year, the dawn of MIC Ventures’ creation was realized through the establishment of a holding company.

As Zeidan describes it, the minister of telecommunications and the two MICs asked him, as the idea’s parent, if he could take on the management responsibility for getting the fund off the ground. He accepted the mantle of steering this new financial vehicle toward the goals of creating new jobs and initiating a conversation between the private and public sectors.

According to him, MICV has a three-tiered process of operations. The management team sources prospective deals that are assessed at periodic meetings by an investment team comprised of seasoned experts from the relevant fields. “I wanted to make sure that there is somebody who is an expert in every concerned vertical, so that, if a proposed deal is on the table, I have someone who understands the related sector from the inside out—for example, cloud technology, or payments and transfers,” Zeidan says. He adds that the investment committee’s size could be expanded from the current five to six members to assure that a sufficient number of experts are available to attend the meetings, which are intended to be held every other month in the initial phase of operations and less frequently later on.

Investments that are endorsed by this committee are then presented to the board of MICV for a final decision. The board, which represents MIC 1 and MIC 2 as the equal owners of the fund company, presently has five members, one of whom is independent, Zeidan says. He concedes that MIC owner MOT—and thus the current holder of the ministerial post—by default plays a decisive role in the equation. He claims that the ministry has recently become conversant in financial and entrepreneurship language that was never heard in MOT offices just a year or six months ago, and confirms that the current Minister of Telecommunications Jamal Jarrah has given full support to the fund project.

Total buy-in

The minister, his main advisors, and the top management of the two MICs have fully bought into the MICV project, claims Zeidan. “They and I see the fund as a very good thing for the MOT, for the two MICs, the Lebanese entrepreneurship sector, and hopefully for the country as a whole,” he enthuses. He acknowledges the possibility of political change affecting the ministry and notes that he often heard such concerns in discussions with people in Lebanon, however, he argues in response that the decision to set up MICV was carried by the full range of stakeholders and would not have happened otherwise. Moreover, the possibility of shifts in the political landscape, as far as it might affect his role, does not deter him. “In the event that there is any [political] change and if this change results in a change in the manager, so be it. I will have no grievances whatsoever in this respect,” he declares.

Sitting in his corporate office in a Beirut downtown quarter that has found favor as the base of operations for local financial players and law firms as well as international actors up to the World Bank Group, Zeidan makes a strong personal impression of being situated in a very safe distance from any economic precariat status or existential dependency on a government-related job. Concerns over partisan communal interests and individual corruptibility are not screaming from the walls of this office. 

However, in the wider context of national economic development prospects, the ghouls of Lebanese politics have darkened the pages of the country’s ICT narrative for so many years that many questions beg to be answered in any scenario that includes the terms MOT and ICT. How to defuse worries about monopolistic structures, and dependencies on political deciders and oft-changed ministers in charge of the telecommunications portfolio? How to restore confidence among local ICT firms and international partners whose memories of Lebanese mobile telephony have been tainted by experiences of a sovereign who chose to abandon contracts and break promises? How to assure a sector that it would not again be treated as welcome cash cow and milked to excess, just because it succeeded at a time when the state faced cash flow problems and other political economy issues? Such questions, or issues such as the proper accountability and reporting of monies that might flow from successful investments back into public channels, are not among Zeidan’s declared priorities. 

He explains that what happens between the MIC shareholders in MICV—up the line to the MOT and beyond in terms of reporting—is not under his purview, and prefers to emphasize the potential he sees on the level of the new fund and further opportunities for improving public sector partnerships with private sector actors. He says, “The reason why I am managing this particular venture is because I was the person that initiated the process to establish it. My intention is to make this fund happen and getting it to work, and I feel that we can make this work. Transfer of private sector culture and language has happened now at the MOT and I see the potential for the same to happen at other ministries, such as the Ministry of Economy. My belief is that you will see other, similar initiatives from other ministries. I think this will be fantastic.”


Creating synergies

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MIC Ventures is a new fund in the Lebanese entrepreneurship ecosystem. Seeking to boost the value of startups and young companies that specialize in areas of interest from a mobile telecommunications perspective as well as establishing partnerships between sector companies and the two Lebanese mobile networks, MIC Ventures is itself a startup backed by governmental vision. Executive set down with the fund’s manager, Khaled Zeidan.

E   When did MIC Ventures start to operate?

We had an introductory investment committee about two weeks ago [in the first half of February] and we expect to have a second one at the end of March [or] beginning of April. For investment opportunities, we are looking at four verticals and we also want to say that we are activists, we are not passive investors.

E   So you are looking to create synergies and coherent portfolios of invested companies in each vertical rather than betting on the search for singular “unicorns” and super performers?

Yes. One and one in our thinking does not need to add to two but can be made into three or more, meaning synergies can be combined into tremendous value, but we need to put some acumen and effort into it to align interests and objectives. This is exactly what we are trying to achieve with this fund, by introducing young entrepreneurs to the two large Telecom operators in Lebanon as partners. We are seeking to identify opportunities and build a storyline that makes sense to the owners of the fund—which are MIC 1 and MIC 2 and ultimately the MOT [Ministry of Telecommunications]—and the entrepreneurs, while creating skilled job opportunities which is in line with the MOT, the PM, and the government’s vision.

E   What do you want to achieve with regard to relations with local and foreign corporations, ICT companies that you want to invest in, and with other innovative companies?

We want to build partnerships with as many players as possible, and we want to be as agile and proactive as possible in creating opportunities. We are looking to invest in companies that are able to become cash flow positive with our help and the support of our sponsors.

E   What is the size of your team?

For the moment we are a team of four. In the end, we aim to be a team of six.

E   Can something be done on the level of MICV to assure that the consumers get the best deals from the companies in which the fund has invested?

The consumers will get new products and services. These new products and services are for the general public. In some instances, they would be free products and services paid for by the operators. In other instances, the products and services will be paid for by the consumers. The companies [that MICV will invest in] already exist and have proof of concept or are operating as businesses with revenues. All that we are doing is creating a partnership between the portfolio companies and the two operators.

E   Will MICV have a policy of taking an equity stake in every portfolio company and a seat on the company’s board?

Absolutely. MIC Ventures will aim to take equity or quasi equity stakes, depending on the structure of the transaction. We will in many ways have approaches in terms of investment criteria and investment policies that meet basic global standards and are similar to the criteria used by funds established under BDL Circular 331. The only thing that will differ is that our target market will be slightly different from others. Having said that, we see MIC Ventures as being complementary to Circular 331 funds, not as a competitor.

E   Will it be a strategy or policy of MIC Ventures to be a majority shareholder when investing in a company?

Our standard policy is not to have majority but to have reserved matters that protect MIC Ventures.

E   Will you seek international VCs to co-invest with you in Lebanon?

Yes, we will.

E   You also mentioned financial institutions. Do you see banks as your potential co-investors?

We see banks as potential co-investors on investments that are relevant to their businesses. For instance, if we have a specific investment in the Fintech space, it might be interesting for banks to come in as co-investors when MIC Ventures have a certain capacity and where they can fill the rest [of the investment need].

E   As for the size of investments that you are interested in doing, what are the parameters? Would you go as small as investing in a fresh startup or look at entrepreneurs that have just completed an acceleration round?

We are willing to go as low as $100,000 and we have a cap of $2 million unless the board decides otherwise.

E   But might there be limits from the perspective of the amount of work that is required for assessing a small opportunity, the due diligence and all?

We do not want to discard smaller investments if we see merit in them.

E   Can you elaborate more on the structure of the board and the venture and process under which MIC Ventures will proceed?

First, there is the management team which will source opportunities [and] present them to the investment committee—which we expect will convene every two to three months—and the final approval will be done by the board.

E   What is the structure of the board and investment committee?

With regards to the board, there is one independent member and the other members are equally split between the MICs. As for the investment committee, they are individuals who have a deep understanding in the ecosystem.

E   Is there already a strategy for exits from portfolio companies?         

The current ecosystem is not conducive to exits through public offering. We think that a trade sale or even an acquisition by MIC 1 or MIC 2 are more realistic exit strategies. We are realistic and that is why we are looking for companies that will survive and thrive without our continuous injection of capital.

E   How many board members and how many investment committee members do you have?

The board right now is composed of five individuals but will be expanded to seven. In terms of the investment committee, right now we have seven individuals.

E   What will be the frequency of the investment committee meetings?

In the beginning we will have them every two months and then probably every three to four months later on.

E   As to governance on the board level, do you adhere to standards for private enterprise?

It is a private entity and transparency standards will be applied on all transactions. We will have a website listing our portfolio companies.

VAT rises from 10 to 11 percent

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Since at least 2011, the IMF has urged the Lebanese government to increase its VAT rate and to broaden the tax’s base by lowering exemptions. After this year’s increase of the VAT standard rate by 1 percent, from 10 to 11 percent, Lebanon’s VAT rate is still the second-lowest in the region after Djibouti, and there remains room for increasing it without hindering its efficiency, according to the IMF’s 2017 report on Lebanon. Lebanon’s VAT standard rate is even less than the average rate of 15.7 percent for its peers in upper-middle income developing countries, according to a 2011 IMF report.

Lebanon’s VAT increased by 1 percent on January 1; however, it is expected to contribute no more than an additional 0.7 percent to tax revenues (assuming all other factors remain constant). The impact of this raise is alleviated by the wide range of exempt goods and services, such as basic needs (meat, dairy products, medicines) and the supply of some activities of public interest (medical services and education). It is also possible to deduct the tax paid on purchases (input VAT) from that collected from customers (output VAT) on taxable activity; only the net balance is filed and paid to the treasury, which eliminates what is known as the cascading effect of the tax. In addition to preserving these exemptions, the 2017 law taxed no new items, goods, or services.

It is well known that taxes, while not popular, are needed. The introduction of VAT in 2002, the tax on bank interest in 2003, and then increasing  both in 2017, were not undertaken by choice, but were instead a bitter treatment for the increasing public debt and its service. A flashback in fiscal history shows that Lebanon’s economic situation has deteriorated since 2010, placing public finance in a worrying situation and requiring the government to optimize its tax revenues. This critical public finance situation now requires the Lebanese state to significantly increase tax revenues. Therefore, the government has not only focused on raising taxes, but also implemented comprehensive reforms of the tax administration. Focusing mainly on the modernization of the latter, these developments aim at keeping pace with global changes, such as setting up an organizational structure based on the function type (e.g. audit, data processing, taxpayers’ services, objection, and appeal) instead of the tax type income tax, inheritance tax, VAT, etc. This will result in strengthening the transparency and accountability of agents, as well as improving the relationship between the tax authority and taxpayers.

Raising taxes does not only aim at generating revenues; it also has a significant role in ensuring social justice. Lebanese taxation is based on the coexistence of two regimes—proportional and progressive—allowing both the tax administration and the taxpayer to cumulate their advantages. Since a VAT was first introduced in February 2002, this tax has become the most important source of tax revenue for the treasury due to its sheer tax base (see chart). With a single standard rate, VAT contributes some LL3 trillion (or $2 billion) per year, more than one-third of Lebanon’s annual tax revenues, or about 0.52 percent of GDP per one percent of VAT, according to the IMF. It is an indirect tax collected on behalf of the treasury by registered companies. This destination-based tax does not differentiate between imported and locally produced goods; it is levied on all taxable products and services delivered on Lebanese territory.

Livia Bergmeijer | Executive

After more than a decade of VAT in Lebanon, indicators show that it is an effective form of taxation. The question remains: To what extent does this tax help mobilize the revenues of the state and rebuild the tax system? It would be desirable to have a tax that is evolving, profitable, difficult to defraud, and well recovered, with low exemptions and derogations. The increasing implementation of VAT in the world—more than 160 countries out of 190 have some form of VAT—indicates that this tax has proved to be a robust source of revenue, representing more than one-third of state tax revenues. Due to its sheer base, VAT is responsible for collecting a significant amount of tax revenues that ensure the sustainability of public finance.

In addition, the implementation of a single VAT rate, with a system of reverse charge of the tax by companies and a declarative system that relies increasingly on e-filing and e-payment, helps limit the cost of administering this tax and cuts the tax compliance cost. A multitude of tax rates makes the management and control of VAT more complex, which encourages tax evasion and fuels litigation. A single rate ensures the simplicity of the system, with less limitation to meet tax obligations.

Citizens notice any increase in tax rates, but overlook tax exemptions. Substantial VAT exemptions have been established in the Lebanese tax law since March 2012, such as the exemption applied to red and green diesel.

If we want a civilized society, we should start by ensuring a modern tax system based on effective and efficient taxes. We citizens are all responsible for paying our taxes. This is a cornerstone for a better quality of life and a prosperous Lebanon. Meeting spending needs and the sustainability of the public finance cannot be ensured by continuous government borrowing, but by mobilizing tax revenues based on a fair and modern tax system. The misery of every society is when the government stops adjusting its regulations and taxation system and refrains from raising taxes, the main source of the country’s revenues. This, however,  will not be the case in Lebanon.

L’espoir fait vivre

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On March 27, before addressing an auditorium filled with our best scholars, academics, researchers, journalists, intellectuals, and experts who have dedicated their lives for this nation, I asked if any of them was granted access to or had seen or even touched one page of the Capital Investment Plan (CIP) CEDRE project—the answer was a unanimous “NO.” The rest of the conference, which was titled “Enhancing Domestic Accountability in Lebanon in Light of CEDRE Conference,” organized by Issam Fares Institute and the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, was a succession of inspirational but frustrated presentations on what should be done to save Lebanon.

The CIP was eight months in the making and was endorsed by the cabinet on March 21. The CIP and a vision document for stabilization, growth, and employment that included ideas for reform were posted online seven days before CEDRE as Executive went to print, which did not allow time for a full evaluation. The McKinsey report on Lebanon’s productive sectors did not make it online. The rushed and opaque manner in which these pillars have been prepared is alarming.

We live for the day when the role of civil society organizations is reinforced and their rights respected. We have a seat at the table because we, the citizens—the owners—need to monitor the practices of our self-entitled politicians who have manipulated our trust and mismanaged our resources for decades. It is not a privilege to have that seat; it is a right. When it is treated as a privilege, and accepted as such, we shall be as corrupt as the establishment itself.

For 20 years, no one has called for the realization of each one of the projects that are now included in the CIP as much as this magazine. No one called for the adoption and implementation of reforms as much as we did, and no one has been a witness of our government’s disregard to these appeals as much as we have. So forgive us for our frustration, but we are not seeing, or getting assurances, that this call for reforms is authentic. And as long as it does not fall within the framework of inclusiveness and participation, citizens will find it difficult to swallow the legitimacy of our government.

It’s unfortunate, but we are only left with the hope that the World Bank, the IMF, the UN and its agencies, will help donor countries learn from the past and go beyond their political motivations to help institutionalize our government’s commitment to best practices.

We remain ambitious, positive, and naive. Let’s hope for the best.

Inshallah.

This won’t be easy

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This month, Lebanon will send a delegation of state officials to Paris to pitch an infrastructure development program dubbed the Capital Investment Plan (CIP) to the international community and private investors. Alongside the CIP officials will also unveil an economic vision, fiscal discipline measures, and structural and sectoral reforms.

Of the four, Executive has only seen the CIP, which it obtained through an informal channel despite the plan’s endorsement by cabinet on March 21. The others are not accessible. On paper, the CIP calls for some $20 billion in funding for 250 projects scheduled over the next decade, until 2030, though at this stage the plan is not set in stone.

What effect the CIP will have on the economy is unknown, and we do not know when further information will be unveiled, but the picture will be clearer after Paris. For now, we know that the development plan calls for raising debt to pay for the projects. Obviously, this will increase Lebanon’s public debt, but we do not know by how much because at this stage it does not appear to have been modeled.

One component of the plan that would have a large impact to the economy, but remains ambiguous, is expropriation. The expropriation program, some $2.6 billion as written in the CIP, will basically transfer funds from the public sector to a specific group of landowners. The state will borrow the money it needs to compensate the owners for their land. This implies a subsidy to consumption, but the owners are undisclosed. Therefore, it is impossible to gauge whether the transfer of wealth will be socially just, and we do not know how these people will spend the money they receive for land. The  plan’s infrastructure projects, which are required to support the economy, will have to be built somewhere, so expropriation spending will be necessary.  Whether the projects or the subsidy to consumption process will bear the fruits of enhanced economic productivity and competitiveness over the long term is unforeseeable.

The needs of communities and stakeholder groups will have to be balanced, and Lebanon’s high level of communal fragmentation will be  an especially challenging obstacle. Our leaders must find a way to create a compromise culture that finds a mutually beneficial approach, but our past experience with this is not so encouraging.

Lebanon saw volatile periods first during the years of the late Rafic Hariri, where compromises were insincere, and people vied to get the biggest slice of pie for their own interest. In the post-Rafic Hariri years, after 2006, the compromises were reached on a horizontal level but at the expense of greater disruption at the vertical level: elites were happy, but the people neglected.

The challenge from that perspective is to reach a compromise that is better for the country. All the projects in the CIP are geared toward boosting employment for refugees as part of a formula that rests on international support—which Lebanon deserves. Our country made efforts to take care of refugees when no one else would. But is this support for refugees genuine or is it of a political nature? Political statements and market observations provide no indication that this support is yet coherent, internalized, or even forward-thinking, and the support might come from all stakeholders, but they need to make much more effort to think of the needs of people. Promises are abundant but whether they are empty remains to be seen.

Payback

If the CIP, in its current incarnation, tells us one thing, it is that we are not banking on the future—we are banking on hope. Lebanon is attempting to raise some $20 billion in new money, whether in the form of public-private partnerships (PPP), grants, or concessional lending, all of which will have to be reimbursed in one way or another; no one invests without the expectation of returns.

Repayment arrangements will likely vary by stakeholder. The World Bank, for example, would want to be reimbursed in monetary returns and is interested in avoiding the headache of Lebanese instability. The hope of institutions like the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and others is to maintain stability and keep Syrian refugees from leaving Lebanon and flooding into the EU. For this, they are ready to provide concessional loans, essentially at subsidized rates of interest. But loans remain loans and, of course, EBRD would like to get their money back, with a little bit of compensation for their time and effort. PPP partners will hold similar expectations in the sense that they may want to help Lebanon, but with clear expectation of investment security and profits. Some Lebanese, be they locals or diaspora, may be interested in doing something for their country, but even they will expect to see real returns on their investments. Taking on $20 billion in debt to pay for these projects means Lebanon would have an obligation of $20 billion, meaning each and every Lebanese national acquires a future obligation, piling on burden to our collective responsibility. So we as a society have to be aware of that.

Painful reforms

Lawmakers are considering a 5 or 6 percent budget position cut to state spending that the cabinet endorsed in mid-March. What we spent in 2017, almost $16 billion, is lower than the new obligations that the CIP could represent, $20 billion. If we borrow this money, it is just reshaping and increasing our obligation. Our public debt is now over $80 billion, and new debt from implementing the CIP means we are burdening new generations long into the future. These obligations will only be met if there is an increase in economic productivity, and economists Executive spoke with predict that Lebanon needs to achieve, over many years, at least an 8 percent annual growth rate to claw its way out from under the public debt.

With Lebanon’s current demographics, conventional wisdom might suggest this to be almost impossible to achieve. Reforms are necessary, and we have been saying this for a very long time. But let us not forget the alternatives. We can decide to effectively bankrupt the state, go into default and ask for the world community to bail us out with an externally imposed rescue plan managed by the World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund. But ask around in countries that went through such processes. It is a recipe for uncertainty and great suffering. Also, Lebanon just does not have it in itself to break down in state default. So we have to succeed to win investors, mobilize our many real friends, and show that we can do as we promise: that we can reform. Reforms are never without pain and people do not like pain. Lebanon will need to embrace this pain if we want capital investment with a lot of external help. To make it work this time it must come with the understanding that it will be painful. All of Lebanon must accept that.

A litmus test in Paris

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April 6 could be a very good Friday for Lebanon. Not only does it unofficially usher in the fruit season, a symbol of renewal and rebirth, but it is also the day that state officials will pitch a set of large-scale infrastructure projects to the international community and investors at the CEDRE conference in Paris.

CEDRE is just one waypoint on a roadmap for rebuilding confidence in Lebanon and stabilizing the economy. Other points along the route were the mid-March security conference held in Rome, and a regional refugee aid conference in Brussels scheduled for later in April. The response at Rome, says Christina Lassen, head of the European Union delegation to Lebanon, “sent a very strong political signal of support” (see interview). Signs of support for Brussels are also positive. The EU commissioner for European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, told reporters after a late-March visit with Prime Minister Saad Hariri that Lebanon would receive part of the EU’s pledge to grant 560 million euros for refugee aid in Brussels. The Paris conference, sandwiched in between Rome and Brussels, is the main act before parliamentary elections scheduled for May, and officials will need to wow investors enough to sell the conference as a success back home.

Lebanese officials will arrive in Paris with an infrastructure development program: the Capital Investment Plan (CIP). In its current iteration, the CIP, a development plan that will raise debt to pay for the rehabilitation and expansion of the nation’s infrastructure, was billed by an advisor to the prime minister at a recent closed door meeting as “Lebanon’s biggest-ever investment plan.” The plan, endorsed by cabinet in mid-March, calls for some $20 billion in funding for 250 projects scheduled over the next decade until 2030—though figures, projects, and timelines are likely to change (see CIP story).

Officials will carry with them three additional pillars: an economic vision, fiscal discipline measures (political parties accepting reductions in the 2018 state draft budget is pointed to as the beginning of this process), and an evolving list of structural and sectoral reforms and good governance measures. The economic vision statement is being prepared by McKinsey & Company, a management consulting firm, but the report had not been made public by the time Executive went to print. Officials have said at conferences and closed-door meetings that the vision would address how to grow Lebanon’s current productive sectors and enhance productivity, and recommend what sectors Lebanon should focus on in the future. 

A bleak picture

An official in the prime minister’s office told a gathering of civil society organizations at a late-March closed-door meeting that the CIP was prepared to address specific economic shortcomings: tremendous challenges in public finances, monetary policy that has exhausted all options to maintain stability, low growth rates, high unemployment, increasing levels of poverty, and the balance of payments problem. The public sector, the official said, was reluctant to invest in the economy, and Lebanon’s infrastructure is worn down because of years of low state investment and overstretched because of the large refugee population plus a growing national population.

The indicators are not good. By the end of January, Lebanon’s public debt reached $80.4 billion, or 146 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product, according to Ministry of Finance figures. Lebanon also suffers the weight of multi-billion dollar deficits year after year, thanks in part to interest payments on its debt, which has become as large and flammable as the doomed Hindenburg blimp. According to International Monetary Fund figures, Lebanon’s current account deficit averaged $9 billion per year, or roughly 21 percent of GDP. (Current account is considered an important indicator of a nation’s economic health, and in general compares imports to exports in terms of goods and the large inflow of remittances, which helps maintain the balance of payments. In Lebanon’s case, outflows are much more than inflows, because of interest payments for its debt). “If a country runs a current account deficit as high as 5 percent of GDP each year for five years, then a significant economic slowdown is highly likely, and so is some kind of crisis,” writes Ruchir Sharma, head of emerging markets and chief global strategist at Morgan Stanley Investment Management, in his 2016 book, The Rise and Fall of Nations.

Syria’s civil war cut off Lebanon’s land routes to trading partners in the Gulf. Between 1 and 1.5 million Syrians sought refuge from conflict in Lebanon, making up a significant proportion of a country as small as Lebanon. For both the local and refugee populations, unemployment has risen and poverty rates have skyrocketed, as Executive reported in December.

Mazen Soueid, who in November was appointed to Lebanon’s Economic and Social Council, told Executive that the country’s economy has been battered by both internal and external dynamics.

The growth rate plunged from 8 percent in 2010 to an average of 1.7 percent between 2011 and 2017, due in large part to the compounding effects of the neighboring civil war but also the two-and-a-half-year presidential void, a paralyzed Parliament, and weak governments. He says Lebanon needs to reach 5 percent growth rates per year just to stabilize and 8 percent growth to pay down the public debt (see Mazen Soueid Q&A).

Lebanon is reluctant to commit new money to infrastructure. Between 2010 and 2016, Lebanon allocated just over $500 million per year, a yearly average of 1.25 percent of GDP, to capital investments. (Full 2017 figures were not yet available for this article.) Any country where public debts and primary deficit are massive burdens would expect the state to be reluctant to invest, and officials have expressed this reluctance simply because the state cannot afford large investments.

From the past

Lebanon appears to be in a situation where the water has risen almost above its head and its body is clutching at any chance to grab a life raft. We have been to Paris before, and made reform promises that, for some reason or another, never came to be. But there is a feeling that this time will be different, inshallah.

Lessons from the past show that the political class of Lebanon, when divided, can scupper any chance for reform. In 1998, when the balance between political powers shifted and Syrian influence (by way of then-President Emile Lahoud) was increasing, to the detriment of Rafic Hariri and Western allies, many of the projects in Hariri’s Horizon 2000 plan were put on hold or canceled. Adding in the economic difficulties of the era made for an appetite that was no longer conducive to such ambitious plans. In contrast, the period between 1989 and 1992, after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, brought changes to the region, and reforms became possible at the beginning of the 1990s that were not during the previous decade. This was derailed later in the decade, when Syrian and Iranian pressure wore down Lebanon, and regional peace initiatives meant to reconcile Israel with its Arab neighbors failed. All the ambitious development that Rafic Hariri was planning was no longer possible.

That is the lesson: If Lebanon now wants to develop the country and invest in infrastructure, the government needs to have a good showing in May in order to see through its reforms. The CIP is needed by politicians aiming for leadership posts in the next government to credibly campaign for reelection. But if they do not have a strong showing in the elections then the development plan may never be heard of again. They need the confidence of the international partners and this confidence will depend to a large extent on how much support they get at the ballot box on May 6. If there is a high level of distrust in the form of low voter turnout, than the probability of implementation may decrease.

Gaining trust

Past experience has taught the private sector to be skeptical about partnering with the Lebanese state. At an investment conference held in early March in Beirut, a Chinese businessman addressed the energy minister, who had earlier spoken about partnering with the private sector to construct power plants. “What guarantees [for] revenue can the government make?” the businessman asked. But the minister had already left, the businessman was told by the panel’s moderator.

Lebanon has had some trouble in partnering with the private sector in the past, and has had zero successful public-private partnerships, remarked Ziad Hayek, secretary-general of Lebanon’s High Council for Privatization and PPP, in a September 2017 interview with Executive. One example from around the turn of the century is the story of Libancell and Cellis, the two cellular companies operating Lebanon’s first-generation mobile network. Their contracts had arbitration clauses, and when the government moved to terminate the contracts prematurely the companies filed for arbitration.

In that case, says Marwan Sakr, a partner at the law firm SAAS Lawyers who specializes in arbitration, the State Council, Lebanon’s highest administrative court, issued an opinion that the arbitration clauses were null and void and that the state could not arbitrate, and ruling instead the court to be the body hearing cases against state entities. In 2002, Lebanon amended its arbitration law to allow arbitration for any state entity, with the Council of Ministers approving the agreement to arbitrate between state entities and other parties, Sakr told Executive. (The number of civil suits against state entities is said to be quite large, according to lawyers Executive interviewed for this story. Executive’s information request to the State Council for the number of civil suits heard by the court against state institutions procuring projects was not answered, and after going to the court after not being able to follow up on the request by telephone, Executive was told that staff are instructed not to pick up the telephone).

It’s not yet clear whether the CIP can prove to investors that Lebanon is worthy of their confidence. Mohammad Alem, a senior partner at the law firm Alem & Associates, told Executive that potential investors the firm had met with had expressed interest in knowing what is in the CIP, and in investing in Lebanon, but few were excited, citing concerns regarding corruption, bureaucracy and red tape, or political interference in bidding processes. He said that foreign investors, including institutional funds, have not shown much appetite yet, and he questions the overall viability of the CIP and its projects.

Investors that Executive spoke with directly were more optimistic. Philippe Ziade, for example, is going to Paris with a wishlist. Ziade, the founder and chairman of Growth Holdings, which on its website claims $3 billion in assets across the real estate, technology, construction, hospitality, and entertainment sectors, wants a robust legal framework for independent power producers to make the market more competitive and to codify the procurement process. He told Executive on the sidelines of an energy conference in mid-March that those measures alone would improve financing costs. Ziade also wants feed-in tariffs to allow anyone to produce electricity (usually in the form of rooftop solar panels) from their home and generate returns by selling power to the state.

Investors and fund managers that show up at CEDRE have the option of investing in Lebanon or investing elsewhere, and they will be looking for jurisdictions that provide lucrative returns and lower levels of risk. Reforms may be a prerequisite to obtaining investors’ commitments, and the list of reforms is long, broad, and ever growing. In general, investors will ask for fiscal discipline, appointment of regulators, and the passing of a backlog of legislation.

The way the state operates must change: that’s the consensus ahead of Paris. Now might be the last chance for serious reforms to prevent the country falling into the abyss, and who knows what would happen to Lebanon deep down in the dark.

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